Re:Dark Internet Mail Environment: Architecture and Specific...
by rwallace on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @12:21AM
(#8818344)
One-time pads only work if you already have a secure way to transmit the pads, and if you have that, you could probably use it to transmit your actual data.
Re:Dark Internet Mail Environment: Architecture and Specific...
by peterwwillis on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @05:13AM
(#8818806)
You only have to transmit the pads securely once, if you send enough of it. The rest of the time you can transmit
non-expensively. That's the whole point. It's the tradeoff of one extra-expensive secured communication once so you can transmit anytime, anywhere afterwards securely. If you really care about nation states grabbing your data, this is a much more reliable system than what is proposed herein. (Though really, just a two-factor auth system would be more secure than what is proposed)
In general, mail has always been a highly centralized distributed system. You would think someone on the darknet would want to decentralize this a bit more, and you know, make it harder to attack than GMail. (This is technically easier to attack than GMail itself) I don't understand why people today don't implement one-time pads into their cryptosystems. It's true that it's probably the most problematic to implement, but it's also the most secure (theoretically).
Let's be frank here: the NSA does not really give a crap about your data, and will probably never look at it, because your data is mainly pictures of cats. But on the off-chance that you are communicating with someone who might be a threat to national security, don't trust the safety of your transmission to protocols that can be breached, 3rd parties who can be issued NSLs, and systems you don't administer. A properly implemented one-time pad between each communicant will stymy even the biggest black ops budget, to the point where your primary concern will be your physical safety and not your password strength.