Re:Sandy bridge, Ivy bridge, Haswell and the mess of Intel p...
by wtallis on Saturday December 27, 2014 @01:02PM
(#8803297)
VT-d is branded as a virtualization feature, but it's also a killer security feature. It should be treated as a hard requirement for any system that has DMA-capable external interfaces like Firewire or Thunderbolt. It can be used to protect the system from exploits that run on the GPU or any of the other processors that are included in peripheral devices. But nobody's going to completely redesign the driver model of their OS if only 3% of their users can reap the benefits.
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Re:Sandy bridge, Ivy bridge, Haswell and the mess of Intel p...
by DSingularity on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @05:46PM
(#8821442)
I actually never thought of it from that perspective. Can you expand on this? Is the primary threat DOS or malicious DMA ops from external interfaces and devices and the primary advantage mitigation by rerouting I/O from that device to a "null" VM?