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Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by ArchD on Tuesday December 23, 2014 @10:22PM (#8791407)
I never understand why people need to connect industrial plants to the Internet. Do they actually need to control them over the Internet instead of on-site?

And, if they need to use the Internet on-site, can't they make an air gap and segregate the computers that can access the Internet from computers that can access the plant machinery?

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by HCIdivision17 on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @12:05AM (#8791625)
I remember a rule a controls engineer once told me: never connect the plant to the Internet. Nothing clever, no humorous quip, no deep insight. Just don't do it. If you do need to get data out to the living world, and you will, then you carefully set up individual firewall rules just for the data system - which very much can not drive the process system.

This is where I begin ranting on the topic.

Why? Because plants aren't secure. They're meant to run all the time by people who may or may not know how to properly use a mouse. There will be passwords taped to monitors, systems that automatically log in to prevent start up delays, and authentication of the order that it-better-just-work-by-default. Under no circumstances should that damn system ever, ever be exposed to the outside world. Not by Ethernet, wireless, or flash drive. It's a young innocent facing the cruel, brutal internet; it's going to get hurt.

New plants are fancy and have highly trained workers with brilliant industrial IP wireless systems with state of the art VM servers and oh god did that guy just plug his phone charger into the damn wrapper HMI and now Windows media player has popped up and no one can acknowledge alarms (this partly why PCs tend to be in large metal boxes, that and dirt/water). No imagine that sort of silliness, but driven by the less savory from outside the intranet.

Just don't risk it. You'll never have a problem, and no one is ever going to care enough to hurt the plant... Except but for that one time when suddenly all the convenience and hubris won't bring back the machine that just slagged itself from some malicious command from outside.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by superuser2 on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @12:35AM (#8791701)
The terrifying part of this is that computers with Windows Media Player installed are running critical infrastructure. Shouldn't that be a stripped-down Linux machine with perfectly understood characteristics and close-to-zero attack surface?

Yes, your scenario is bad I can totally see it happening, but the problem is not that an employee plugged in his phone, it's that you are using a desktop OS for office workers for controls that really non-optionally need to always just work.

Maybe it's not a Windows Media Player launch, but what happens if Java shows up in the taskbar wanting an update, or your anti-virus software (yikes) wants to bug you about updating its definitions, or a modal dialog from the OS comes up? The fact that those are even things that can happen is pretty scary.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by sigkill on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @01:10AM (#8791800)
>The terrifying part of this is that computers with Windows Media Player installed are running critical infrastructure. Shouldn't that be a stripped-down Linux machine with perfectly understood characteristics and close-to-zero attack surface?

Maybe I'm appealing to the wrong sentiment but most of these control softwares aren't available for Linux. Large CO2 generation plants, tissue plants, whatchamaycallit, it's just not available. So, the problem is with the vendors.

Another problem is that the people who decide to buy the software are completely clueless about what is secure or not. They may ask for 'advice' from their more tech savvy juniors but that is merely a formality to confirm their view point, as anything contrary to their already decided viewpoint is quickly discarded with the mental rationalization of 'He probably doesn't have my experience' or 'I know better because I'm senior and I've been around these longer than him.'

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by FranOntanaya on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @04:46AM (#8792274)
Still begs to reason why wouldn't they provide a stripped down industrial Windows for these cases, rather than just a layer of Enterprise apps on top of the regular thing. Even their "Enterprise for Manufacturing" page is all about apps and Metro tablets.
Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by zb on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @09:13AM (#8792884)
They do, it's called Windows Embedded, and OEMs customise it to include only the components they need.
Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by bbrian on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @07:55AM (#8792660)
> that is merely a formality to confirm their view point

Is there a term for this? I often give out to people when I see they're just going to discard my advice if it's not what they have already decided.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by mrlyc on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @03:29PM (#8794429)
Confirmation bias.
Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by mweatherill on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @01:11AM (#8791802)
Windows has overwhelming market share in the process control industry. Microsoft has long standing partnerships with the majority of the process control vendors. The attach surface argument was never relevant when networks were physically isolated. There is a slow shift towards Linux however many systems have extremely long lifespans.
Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by superuser2 on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @04:03AM (#8792183)
>The attach surface argument was never relevant when networks were physically isolated.

If the network is designed according to this philosophy, then it will be trivial for an insider to breach the airgap. That could be someone who hates his boss, someone who's about to be fired, somebody getting paid by a competitor, somebody getting paid by a criminal enterprise planning on shorting the stock, somebody coerced or coopted by a state actor.

If the process control network is soft and chewy for anyone who can put his finger on an ethernet or USB port, you are still far from secure - as Iran learned, by the way.

Windows Embedded is relatively sane, but that's not going to have Java and Windows Media Player and antivirus software hanging out, and it's (in part) designed to let you whittle its size and attack surface down to exactly what you need. But vanilla Windows having marketshare is just baffling to me.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by ForcesOfOdin on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @04:56AM (#8792298)
Seems to me, an insider wouldn't need to "breach the air gap". Quite literally they could just walk over to the controls.

So defending against the disgruntled employee, or impostor employee, armed invading non-employees,...that should be the problem realm for onsite security and management, not software designers.

But yes, you're right. That is baffling. People are fcking terrible with computers, and for most of the roles they shouldn't have to be more competent. The controls should be about as flexible as an atm machines user interface.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by superuser2 on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @06:14AM (#8792433)
>Quite literally they could just walk over to the controls.

Control systems may not be designed for IT security, but they are designed for safety. You would expect:

- Limits that prevent an operator from pushing a parameter to an obviously insane value

- Alarms that sound audibly and visibly on other control panels, in a control room, etc. when a situation is heading out of control or is actively dangerous

- Automated failsafes that take action to correct dangerous situations

- Audit trails that indicate what buttons were pushed, possibly by whom

- Logical access control so that i.e. line workers cannot change configuration, damaged equipment can be immobilized, a particularly sensitive operation enforces a 2-man rule, etc.

- When an employee is fired (or goes home for the night), he can no longer influence the plant in any way.

All of these would make sabotage by walking up to the controls difficult - at the very least, someone else would know about it in time to evacuate, and at best, the system would automatically correct itself while locking you out and sounding an alarm at your supervisor's desk.

If I've pwned the control system, then I can push parameters beyond the engineers' limits while MITMing and falsifying reports from sensors so that everything appears to be normal, no failsafes kick in, and no alarms go off until everybody is dead. Forensic examination of the audit log would not show me doing anything strange.

If it's my last day and I've plugged a tiny, GSM-enabled, PoE attack platform into an ethernet port, the the fact that security has taken my badge won't stop me - I can do all this from home.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by jschwartzi on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @10:48AM (#8793205)
Not all of these things can be solved by a control system alone, at least not without a ton of investment in RFID and other auto-id infrastructure. Some human is still going to have to administrate your system, and he or she needs to be educated and trained, and they need to value security.

In the article's case, for example, they made it sound like the "hacker" basically conned someone into giving him access to the remote management interface. The only way you can fix a problem like that in software is to make the interface totally inaccessible.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by rab_oof on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @09:01AM (#8792850)
In a lot of shops, some old crusty box is used until it fails. It could be running xp or win2k.

At least that was how an ivy-league's student housing maintance shop and also a nuclear engineering service shop were run.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by superuser2 on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @12:12AM (#8791642)
They do not see themselves as targets. Their systems are likely bespoke, or at the very least obscure. And, more importantly, they have bigger problems to worry about, like operating their businesses.

As it becomes more clear that yes, someone will go to that trouble and it will have catastrophic consequences, you would hope that these things would get better.

More likely, someone will pay a "security consulting" company $100 million to run a Nessus scan and tell them to turn on Automatic Updates on their Windows infrastructure.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by noonespecial on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @02:05AM (#8791909)
You don't pay them the 100mil to run the scan. You pay them the big bucks to park themselves at the top of the lawsuit list when things go wrong. Its more like insurance at that level than technology.
Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by HCIdivision17 on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @12:16AM (#8791654)
A better, more serious answer: always have two networks. Preferably physically separated (though I hear virtual networks are pretty ok with the right router equipment). The machines holler on one, and the administrative support on the other. I've seen what happens when it's even just tried to put both on the same layer, and it's inevitably some form of minor disaster. Not just because of security, mind, but because you really don't want your file transfer to a network drive to even slightly lag a sensor yelling back to the PLC about an interlock's state.

If you need to get on the process network, use a VPN, and only open to a machine that can't actually run equipment. A programming terminal may be made available to save costs so an integrator doesn't need to fly in for every support call, but these access points tend to require a VPN through at least two firewalls. (And even then, often you would still insist on them coming in person, for all manner of other reasons.)

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by lstamour on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @01:49AM (#8791869)
See also: https://www.tofinosecurity.com/blog/why-vlan-security-isnt-s... (and its comments, which echo different points)
Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by ArchD on Tuesday December 23, 2014 @10:31PM (#8791421)
OK, granted they may want to monitor the plant remotely. Then they could have a plant-connected machine dump UDP monitoring packets to an Internet-connected machine, and have the plant-connected machine block all incoming packets from the Internet-connected machine.
Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by gear54rus on Tuesday December 23, 2014 @10:45PM (#8791450)
It seems that there are many ways this could be done right (and does not seem a particularly hard challenge), it's just that people in charge probably were pretty much inept at that task.

You know how it is, no one cared about it until it happened. It just wasn't a priority.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by spacecowboy_lon on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @04:41AM (#8792260)
I get the impression from dealing with german companies that they tend to be very good at traditional "engineering" but when it comes to it/computers they are 10 or 15 years behind.

I also think that in germany its considred that the good engineers and asociate profesionalas want go and work for firms like Audi.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by fidotron on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @09:03AM (#8792852)
It's not just Germans. Anyone that isn't primarily in software has this phenomenon. Mobile phone makers, for example, are a disaster, and it's only having a whip wielded by a software company with some power over them that prevents it becoming a complete train wreck.

In my experience the most dangerous are engineers in other domains that learned just enough programming to get the job done but can't understand the giant holes they've created and not run into.

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by spacecowboy_lon on Wednesday December 31, 2014 @09:25AM (#8819435)
Testify (Brother or Sister) having worked for a big telco we regarded the mobile side as grade inflated "amatuers"

I still recall one of my colegues (working on the core IP network) being amused that one UK mobile provider was still using NT4 in their core network.

Ill be nice and not write what we thought about the US cariers

Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by spacecowboy_lon on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @04:45AM (#8792272)
Well use private curcuits or go old school use modems with dialback ie you call the modem it disconects and calls you back on a hard coded number
Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by mweatherill on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @01:17AM (#8791808)
It is very unlikely that the process control network is connected to the Internet. However it is almost certainly connected to the corporate Intranet. Think about all of the metric data available on the process control network - that is needed by engineers for analysis, ERP systems for financials, asset management systems for maintenance etc. With an air gap, you can't do any of that in real-time.
Re:Computer intrusion inflicts massive damage on German stee... by testrun on Wednesday December 24, 2014 @02:01AM (#8791896)
The solution is to run a historian in the DMZ, only the historian can read data from the DCS, and the corporate systems (ERP, BI etc) read data from the historian. And nothing from outside can update the DCS.