Re:Multiple vulnerabilities released in NTP
by dvanduzer on Friday December 19, 2014 @08:34PM
(#8775526)
The average longevity of a Kerberos ticket makes it the perfect example for this attack vector, actually.
Are you familiar with something other than NTP as a time source for devices without CMOS? I have a project that desperately needs crypto without a clock.
Re:Multiple vulnerabilities released in NTP
by cbsmith on Saturday December 20, 2014 @11:46PM
(#8778965)
If you are really worried, use layer 3 or layer 2 security (say with IPSec) to secure NTP communications.
Yes, there is a bit of a bootstrapping problem, but you can address that with a bootstrapped handshake that sets a clock baseline.
Alternatively, you could just hardwire a radio receiver (like say... a GPS receiver).
Ummm, no. NTP normally runs on machines that have a local clock/battery, but which need an established network clock anyway.
> Critical initialization code should probably compare uptime with current epoch time if it needs a random seed for a long-use token.
Using time as a random seed is probably a mistake in the first place. You could perhaps try to add entropy from a clock, but you'd want another source of entropy. Generally crypto code needs network clocks for other things (think of Kerberos ticket expiration).