> According to the OAuth2 spec[1], username and password are REQUIRED
> fields. Allowing clients to generate tokens based off of cookies is
> reckless.
It's possible I'm not understanding you correctly, but the section of the spec
to which you linked is describing the "Resource Owner Password Credentials
Grant", just one _possible_ flow for requesting an access token. In that same
section the spec reads: > The authorization server should take special care when enabling this
> grant type and only allow it when other flows are not viable.
(read that section here: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.3)If you read the authorization grant overview section (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-1.3), you'll see that the spec also defines an "Authorization Code" flow (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-1.3.1) – this is what most sites implement.
Also worth reading is the section of the spec dedicated to security considerations (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10). There is an entire subsection regarding the password authentication flow you're referencing. Choice excerpts:
> This grant type carries a higher risk than other grant types because it
> maintains the password anti-pattern this protocol seeks to avoid. The
> client could abuse the password, or the password could unintentionally be
> disclosed to an attacker (e.g., via log files or other records kept by
> the client).
> The authorization server and client SHOULD minimize use of this grant
> type and utilize other grant types whenever possible.They all let you approve if you are already logged in.
When the user is already logged in via a cookie set by the authentication system (i.e. an existing valid session), they don't get prompted for a password again; the authentication system will simply redirect to the OAuth2 request url. The typical OAuth2 implementations shouldn't be reading the authentication cookies directly.
The "password flow" in OAuth2 is really a special case for those who want to bypass the separate authentication system and use OAuth2 directly for both authentication and authorization.
That said, I agree that some of the giants are fine with using cookies for auth in OAuth2. And while that indicates that this is a possible use case, OAuth2 is capable of being used in many ways and Digital Ocean's usage still doesn't make much sense.
Useful CSRF exploits depend on the server to trust session data to authenticate client actions. OAuth2 is designed for allowing external (third-party) applications to communicate with you. Cross-site requests are an expectation in OAuth2. If you ignore the spec and skip proper authentication, you're in a bad spot anyway.
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749 (page 37 & 38)