If you are concerned about security, the second mode is you set your own "pass phrase" on the PEM file. But oh my lord, make sure you remember that pass phrase because Backblaze never writes it to disk and if you forget it, NOBODY ON EARTH is getting your files. Not you, not the USA government, not Backblaze, that data is GONE. You cannot recover that password. This is a good security mode if you would be arrested if the NSA got a copy of your data, because we don't think it can be broken.
As brianwski wrote in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8169040:
...[I]f you lose a file, you have to sign into the Backblaze website and provide your passphrase which is ONLY STORED IN RAM for a few seconds and your file is decrypted. Yes, you are now in a "vulnerable state" until you download then "delete" the restore at which point you are back to a secure state.
The reason they would need the private keys should be obvious. They are a data disaster recovery service. In the event of a disaster where all of your drives fail, or are inaccessible you would still need access to your data. So if the only copy of the private key isn't on their servers you would be shit out of luck, not exactly a good situation for a company like theirs.
But yeah, store the private key, but make it encrypted by a secure password only decrypted locally, and update documentation to make this clear.
I think even this is "too secure". I forget my 'secure passwords' regularly, and I'm sure I wouldn't be the only one. It's not a huge improvement over telling a user to print out a private key and keep it somewhere safe.
Given the likely threats to Backblaze, I'd encrypt user backup private keys with a threshold or other multi-key scheme. No individual Backblaze employee's key would be sufficient to decrypt a backup; you'd need the active participation (and private knowledge) of at least a few. That prevents individuals from snooping, and requires compromising several employees to decrypt backup data.
Their knowledge base entry at https://help.backblaze.com/entries/20203731-Can-you-tell-me-... doesn't clarify wether or not the secret private password is transmitted to their servers to decrypt the private keys there which would make the scheme rather weak.
Ideally, the private keys would remain on the user's PCs.