If H is secure then F is not computable. If they can do a trick like this then their hashing is no good.
Another possibility would be
Yeah, you can approach it like a puzzle and figure out what crazy set up they could have, but Occam's Razor has to apply at some point. I'm betting they did the dumb thing, not the strange thing that is mostly pointless.
Can you point to something more than assertion, here?
"Yeah, you can approach it like a puzzle and figure out what crazy set up they could have, but Occam's Razor has to apply at some point. I'm betting they did the dumb thing, not the strange thing that is mostly pointless."
It's mostly pointless, but it's increasingly common knowledge that the dumb thing is dumb. It's more subtle that the pointless thing is pointless. If I had to bet, I'd also bet that they did the dumb thing, I just think it's marginally less conclusive than had been implied.
I'll give a shot at why this implies that H is not a secure hash function, though I could be wrong. The outputs of a secure hash function should be randomly distributed across the set of all possible outputs. If H is a secure hash function that outputs a value in the set {0,1}^128 (a 128 bit output), then H(a) and H(a+a) should both be 128 bit outputs whose mapping are indistinguishable from values chosen truly at random from this set. Although there is a discernable pattern in the two inputs to H (the concatenation), there should be no discernable pattern in the two outputs of H that you could use to reliably map H(a) to H(a+a) for any given a.
Another possibility would be that they compute and send both H(a) and H(firsthalf(a)), if fisthalf(a) == secondhalf(a). That would work with any hash function, but I think would not appreciably increase security.