Encrypted (Certified) COOL GREEN
Encrypted (Self-Signed) EVIL RED
Unencrypted NOTHING / NEUTRAL CHROME
Tell me how the logic works here (for an average user).( http://wingolog.org/archives/2014/10/17/ffs-ssl )
...it should probably look like this:
Safe against active attacks:
Encrypted (Certified) COOL GREEN
Encrypted (Self-Signed) SCARY ORANGE
Unencrypted EVIL RED"Neutral Chrome" is the default state of the web -- the site doesn't assert that it should be trusted, and it shouldn't be, and that's the default state people should have in approaching the web.
"Cool Green" is "the site asserts that it has a particular identity and that communication with that identified site is private, and it passes the tests built into the browser's security model to verify all that."
"Evil Red" is "the site asserts that it has a particular identity and that communication with that identified site is private, but it fails the tests built into the browser's security model to verify all that."
Seems to me to be perfectly logical, even if we might prefer a better security model for making and verifying the claims at issue.
Self-signed is a low probability of security.
Signed is a high probability of security.
This continuum makes more sense than the current state of affairs.
If someone forwards encrypted content on behalf of my server, it's called man-in-the-middle attack, and they should not be capable of doing it without the huge red flags.
This is misguided thinking, pure and simple. Because of this line of thinking, your everyday webmaster has been convinced that encrypting data on a regular basis is more trouble than it's worth and allowed NSA (or the Chinese or the Iranian or what have you) authorities to simply put in a tap to slurp the entire internet without even going through the trouble of targeting and impersonating. Basically, this is the thinking that has enabled dragnet surveillance of the internet with such ease.