Re:Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the...
by zymhan on Tuesday November 18, 2014 @11:36AM
(#8624681)
The warning is designed to let people know that who you're talking to can't be proven, which is important when someone tries to impersonate a bank, or your email provider, or any other number of important sites.
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Re:Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the...
by M2Ys4U on Tuesday November 18, 2014 @11:42AM
(#8624735)
CA-signed certificates don't prove you're talking to who you think you are either as any CA trusted by your browser/OS can sign any certificate.
Re:Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the...
by jbinto on Tuesday November 18, 2014 @12:08PM
(#8624873)
Yes. That's not perfect. But it raises the bar for forgery to "can sign certificates as a root authority", which is still fairly high. (e.g. I can't do it, and neither can you.) It stops coffee shop/hotel wifi operators and mobile providers from injecting content into your session.
If we encourage users to blindly accept self-signed certificates (giving us end-to-end encryption but sacrificing identification), nothing would stop those actors from altering your HTTPS sessions as easily as they alter your HTTP sessions today. It's throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
Re:Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the...
by M2Ys4U on Tuesday November 18, 2014 @12:56PM
(#8625178)
You don't need a CA system to solve that problem, though. Take, for example, Convergence[0] which uses a notary system in place of the CA system.
Re:Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the...
by mbrubeck on Tuesday November 18, 2014 @11:47AM
(#8624767)
This is true for most sites now, but is being solved gradually, with hard-coded certificate pinning already shipping in Firefox and Chrome, and the HTTP Public Key Pinning extension coming soon.
Re:Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the...
by Joeri on Tuesday November 18, 2014 @01:18PM
(#8625320)
But when you browse over http, you don't know who you're talking to either, so how are self-signed certificates worse than http?
I'm really having trouble figuring out the attack scenario unique to self-signed certificates that you don't have with plain http.