Re:Vulnerability in Microsoft TLS library could allow remote...
by nitrogen on Wednesday November 12, 2014 @01:49AM
(#8594312)
No, I definitely realize the seriousness of timing attacks. I'm just curious about this particular implementation detail. I would have guessed that using the attacker's length would reveal more about the system than using a fixed length (unless the length of the valid string changed frequently). I'd like to understand why that isn't the case.
Re:Vulnerability in Microsoft TLS library could allow remote...
by kentonv on Thursday November 13, 2014 @12:37AM
(#8600102)
Ah, I see, you're assuming the "valid" string is fixed-width across all requests. I guess in that specific case you might be right. But it's easy for that not to be the case: e.g. if there are several different resources an attacker can request that have different-length strings. For example, an attacker might scan for users with short (=bad) passwords by comparing the time it takes to complete an authentication check against various users. So the safe thing to go is to go with the attacker's string.
It sounds like you are skeptical that timing attacks can be practically exploited. This is a reasonable skepticism that most people go through on initially learning about them. Unfortunately, there are in fact working exploits for this sort of thing.