This is incorrect. Cofactor 1 does not have a complete addition law, nor did original specs forbid cofactor >1 on security grounds. The Montgomery ladder doesn't have certain kinds of weaknesses common in naive implementations of Weierstrass form addition. Clearing the cofactor is easier. I can fit Montgomery ladder in 10 lines, and can't do that with a secure Weierstrass implementation.
Indeed, PGP doesn't bring everything to the table (You fail to mention non-repudiation, but the fact that I can't authenticate a pgp message without producing a transferable signature is a pretty big flaw for general correspondence)... but, considering the the limitations and usability concerns, it appears to me to be most suited and widely used for higher security applications authenticating software distributions with long term keys, which effectively all the rest of our computer security ends up resting on it. Other things end up being protected by OTR, TLS .. or not at all. :( We effectively have no general widely deployed "high security" option for long term person to person encryption and authentication except PGP.