"Almost pointless" due to the vast differences in scale and complexity but still worthwhile, as a contrasting example of a solid safety culture employed by the Apollo engineering and operations teams.

Although the Virgin 60,000 lbf rocket is small by the standards of Apollo, it is still an extremely challenging problem. There are no problem-free or inherently safe options, so safety needs to be engineered in from the bottom up carefully and competently. Otherwise, failures like this will not happen just once.

The engineers involved would do well to study the Apollo program and other successful complex engineering efforts such as nuclear reactors, as well as the counter examples of the two space shuttle that were lost due to management putting schedule ahead of safety.

If there are no inherently safe options, then that tends to preclude engineering in safety. I really don't think you know what you are talking about.

A propulsion system that was "inherently safe" wouldn't have dangerous failure modes. Although Virgin has tried in the past to paint their hybrid prolusion system as being "inherently safe", it isn't. No 60klb rocket engine is. To make any such system operate safely and reliably is a big engineering challenge. I think you don't understand the meaning of the term "inherently safe" in an engineering context.

Could you define it for me then?