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Re:Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP by tptacek on Tuesday October 28, 2014 @11:29AM (#8521452)
Note that beyond just thwarting many attempts at hijacking CAs on an individual connection level, HPKP and/or TACK form the basis of a surveillance system that drastically changes the risk/reward for using compromised CA certificates to conduct mass surveillance. Mass MITM apparatuses will have to assume that some of their victims speak HPKP/TACK and will detect forged certificates; when that happens, there's a decent chance the incident burns the whole CA.

It's not a perfect fix to the CA problem, but it is a huge step in the right direction (which is towards decentralization and peer trust).

Re:Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP by steakejjs on Tuesday October 28, 2014 @12:08PM (#8521681)
It's a shame more people haven't really spent time on Tack. I spent a weekend playing with it and it was really great.

Trevor stopped paying for the TACK test server so Im guessing the push has died. Trust agility and certificate transparency really need to come about...yesterday.

Re:Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP by moxie on Tuesday October 28, 2014 @01:14PM (#8522056)
At this point Google pretty much controls the future of web-oriented internet protocols, since they control the client in the form of Chrome, as well as the server in the form of Google properties. What they do is basically what goes.

People inside of Google were putting together HPKP at the same time that we were putting together TACK, so that was pretty much the end of TACK. HPKP is really simple for Google (just pin their own CA), but isn't as clean for most other major sites (who are stuck with many CAs). It also doesn't offer a layer of indirection away from CAs, which again, is not an issue for Google (they already have a layer of indirection in the form of their own CA), but is less ideal for the rest of us.

It's better than only being able to hardcode pins in the browser binary, but it's a shame that it doesn't take on some of the other pain that's come up with pinning.

Re:Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP by rakoo on Tuesday October 28, 2014 @04:13PM (#8523281)
AFAIU the difference between TACK and HPKP is:

- For TACK, the pinned key is a custom key created just for that, and is transmitted in TLS

- For HPKP, the pinned key is a CA cert key (one of the CA on the chain), and is transmitted in HTTP

I think pinning the CA cert key makes more sense, because this is what they were created for: certs certify, the matter is in how you transport them. OTOH putting all the pinning information directly in the certificate makes more sense to me. We should have every domain owner running its own CA, with a cert that has all required pinning data, signing all TLS keys of the servers, and then sending the minimal chain "server cert" <- "CA cert", and then browsers would pin that cert.

Re:Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP by JetSpiegel on Tuesday October 28, 2014 @01:27PM (#8522149)
If by "control the client in form of Chrome" you mean about a third of marketshare, suure.
Re:Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP by StephenFalken on Tuesday October 28, 2014 @08:03PM (#8524586)
Interesting that you mentioned a trend towards decentralization and peer trust. Does it share some ideas with the now historical paper "Building Trust in Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Electronic Communities" [1] ?

[1] http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.11.6...