If the financial kickback to RSA was 'small' (care to post an analysis) then they added the backdoor to BSAFE for other reasons. Therefore I don't think that argument addresses the thesis.
Here are a list of suites NIST validated with DUAL_EC.
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/drbgval....
Plenty of products relied on BSAFE including enterprise security products like McAfee.
https://lwn.net/Articles/566329/
But practical impact aside, you haven't addressed the primary thesis.
Indeed, many random enterprise security products did use BSAFE. Most of them did so because during the mid/late '90s, a BSAFE license was how you shipped certificate-based public key features, because RSA was enforcing their patent. Many of those products include BSAFE on their manifest but use OpenSSL and Microsoft SChannel instead. And the features we're talking about are things like login pages or agent/server communications for things running on 10-net addresses.
How many of those enterprise security products did end users rely on to protect their secrets from the USG? I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest that number is zero.
If the closest you can come to arguing that all commercial tech enterprises are "voluntold" to build key escrow is a crypto library used by virtually no end-user encrypted communications systems, I'm suddenly a lot less interested in this discussion.
I think Dual-EC probably was a backdoor. I think any commercial product that adopted Dual-EC is worthy of suspicion. Fortunately, so far as I can tell, virtually nothing that matters ever used Dual-EC.