For those reading it should be clear that the US 'voluntells' US corporations to provide access to information and keys and to build in key escrow mechanisms through regulatory and financial leverage, through partnerships, contracts and kickbacks, legal pressure, and otherwise.
Tap and trace laws force telecommunications companies to subvert over-the-wire encryption - they can not subvert end-to-end encryption because they do not provide it. However Bush era interpretations of tap-and-trace and pen register laws expanded analog and phone communications to digital media. Skype, for example was fully and willingully subverted (Snowden docs, again) - the end-to-end crypto removed from the original versions of the product.
If one enters into these conversations only wanting to examine single sentences of law and not the legal process/architecture, one fundamentally introduce a bias. That's okay (freedom of speech). But readers beware that they aren't going to be able to get a full story from legal reductionism.
Do you trust all of them? I doubt it. Of course some companies are more trustworthy than others.
My point is that in a time when trust is in crisis, NONE of the major tech companies is providing users with strong tools for privacy that can't be circumvented for law enforcement or spying.
The claim I was responding to is that CALEA and PATRIOT have the effect of compelling all major US technology companies to implement key escrow or, more generously, some cryptographic or UX compromise with the same effect, in order to effectuate SIGINT.
I know this claim to be false. I said so, and, within the limits of my ability (for obvious reasons), provided my evidence.
If you want to keep talking about how you don't trust tech companies, that's fine by me. We don't have a live argument on that issue; I'm not interested in it.