Also, they list antivirus software as a security measure - all the more reason to publish it all so people with some actual expertise in IT security can have a look at it.
Not to mention the fact that big contracts with AV/security vendors are usually public knowledge and easily accessible. Heck, they probably have press releases indexed by Duck Duck Go!
I understand the argument that you want to show your code to smart people so you can proactively find and fix holes in it, but that's not always feasible or smart.
TLS? SSH? They are considered "secure" because the numbers they use are really, really, really obscure. So obscure that it would take too long to find them through any kind of naive search, to be useful.
Security is not binary, though. Anything that extends the naive search time extends the security. Even if hiding the source code only doubles the search time for an exploit, that's still an improvement.
Where people get in trouble is by overestimating the time extension. For example, by assuming that secret code can never be exploited because it's secret.
That's where the scorn for "security by obscurity" comes from. Not because obscurity is useless, but because the value of obscurity is so easily overestimated.
The useful distinction that is usually made between secrecy and obscurity hinges essentially on how easy it is to swap out the thing that's unknown to the attacker that security depends on. If your crypto key leaks, you generate a new one, and you are secure again, which is why the crypto key is a secret. If your source code leaks, no such thing, which is why hiding it is obscurity.
2. Security by obscurity