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Re:CVE-2014-7169: Bash Fix Incomplete, Still Exploitable by rst on Thursday September 25, 2014 @08:57AM (#8366842)
I'm wondering if it wouldn't be possible to still support "export -f" while making it harder for attackers to fake it out. For example, if "export -f foo" put the function body in an environment variable named "BASH_EXPORTED_FUNC_foo", instead of just "foo", then the next bash, on startup, wouldn't have to even attempt function-body parsing on environment variables which lack that prefix, including a lot of the currently trumpeted attack vectors (SSL_whatever, HTTP_whatever, TERM, SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND, etc.)

This wouldn't be complete mitigation, and isn't a substitute for the current patches, but it could possibly reduce the attack surface for exploit of any similar remaining problems.

(I can imagine that someone, somewhere, as added an "export -f" env var to an AcceptEnv whitelist, or some such thing, and would need to change it, but that's probably a very rare situation.)

(Edited for clarity.)

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