You're homing in on the heart of the matter: VC goals are not at all aligned with entrepreneur goals. A good investment is not necessarily a good business because the VC does not get his/her return from just one business but from the outliers in a series of businesses.
So if they don't encourage everybody to swing for the fences then they are hurting their own prospects, after all if 2 in 200 investments will be 1000 to 1 returns then the other ones statistically don't matter at all, no matter how irrational that sounds.
If you take money from Sequoia, and after years of hard work, you get an offer for an acquisition for $100M, which will make you, the founder, $10M in your pocket, set for life... would you take it, or would you rather risk it all, for a 10% chance to get to a $1B acquisition? I know that when I ask young founders, they'll casually say they'll go for the $1B. I strongly suggest you think slow and hard about this. Because some VCs will not give you a choice, and a 90% chance of making nothing from years of hard work is not fun.
It certainly can turn out better to take the early money, but it's not necessarily risking it all.
We have a grandiosity problem in Silicon Valley. The problem isn't really VC, but the lack of alternatives along the other parts of the risk/reward curve.
Perhaps VC, or even the whole funding side of the startup world is unsuitable an approach which does not occasionally produce Goole-sized companies. Maybe different investors can take advantage of different areas on the risk/reward curve.
In any case, the current wave proliferation of startups is premised on the idea that relatively little cash is needed to get a beachhead. I think it's also true that there are viable ideas that would generate millions or tens of millions per year, but not billions.
I like OKCupid as an example. They actually came out with a blog entry that outlined what they saw as the problem with paid dating sites (a big industry), that their free site works better. It made sense. Free sites have more users, so more people to meet in your area. They don't need dishonest pay-to-reply gimmicks. A bunch of reasons. OKCupid is a popular service with a lot of users. Even if they are generating far less per user than paid subscription sites, they are still able to generate some cash.
If generating less cash by being free results in a better service, the free service should win. If they can make enough to be profitable, pay employees well and keep the service going that's great. Then they sold the company (and pulled that blog post). The site exists, but it's stagnated a little. It seems like a good case study, because there seems to be pressure that builds up for such a service. They're popular enough that people on the street around the world know the name, but not making the kind of dose that interests big money. It seems like there is a pressure for these companies to stop existing. They are pressured to risk massive revenue growth, sell, whatever. The bottom line is that it seems hard for something like this to remain like this. There's a belligerent invisible hand nudging them off the game board.
It's a pity. A dating site isn't saving the world but for people who meet up (or hook up) on the site, it's a good thing.
We would be better off if companies like this could continue in this state. Why can't a business that size continue to exist?
At the end of the day, the investing strategies and internal logic of VCs or angels should not be the sole determining factor for what businesses can exist, should it?
I recently ran a survey of my local startup community in Western NY and 47% of the software startups in the sample said that they intend to pursue venture capital financing in the next two years (with angel funding a distant second). It's likely that 99% of these startups are in for a rude awakening...
Unfortunately, many of these startups blame it on our local funding environment (or lack thereof), which pales in comparison to SV. I blame it in-part on the startup media over-hyping the role of VC in financing an internet company. Many of these startups could turn into profitable small or medium-size businesses, yet they've been brainwashed into thinking VC is the only way to go.
It's sad because they could boost our local economy if they chose to spend their time pursuing a more reasonable financing path that is better aligned with their business model and resources instead of wasting their time pursuing VC.
I think GP's point is that for most other businesses VCs are never in the picture whatsoever, neither at the beginning stage nor later.
- Angels rarely do due diligence, VCs almost always do.
- Angels tend to look much more at who else is investing in the company, almost never want to be 'alone' or 'first'.
- Also they are typically much less experienced as investors and having them on-board can be a pain, especially when you're doing a start-up outside of their field of expertise
- VCs investment tends to come with some visibility perks
- it is usually easier to get investment from a group of angel investors than it is to get investment from a VC
If you're explaining the economics of computerland in broad strokes, there's no significant distinction to make between angel investment and VC. The two groups intermingle, they fund the same projects (with the same expectations of risk and growth), and they even move in the same social circles.
Good point, I will have to work harder on divorcing myself from that. It's hard though. For the purpose of founders that are relatively in-experienced the two groups appear similar enough that there is little to no outward difference. That viewpoint is worth correcting.
But that's definitely exceptional.
If it were making less money then that's supposed to mean it was providing less value (or rather, the converse of this is supposed to be true). A $10bn business is worth 10x as much as a hundred $10m businesses, by definition - and the monetary valuation is supposed to reflect the human valuation. Corollary: if you stop working on your $10m business and instead take a 1% shot at a $10bn business, that's being more productive. And that's the game that VCs are in.
The last company I worked for, and another before that, were startups that got to the $100m stage and then sold to private equity (with a merger in the mix), to become mature, profitable, "boring" but useful businesses. It does happen (admittedly this is London rather than the Valley), it's just less newsworthy.
VC isn't the way to do it - that's not their business model - but in my (limited) experience they're happy to sell to the kind of entity that's in that business (private equity), and pocket the modest profit, if that's the way the business goes. As a founder you'll have to make the case for it, but it can be done.
I think this is a misunderstood or over-extrapolated assumption from liberal economics. Especially with the economics of free or very cheap services, I think revenue can be far more disconnected from total "utility" of a business. Massive online services generate a lot of uncultured utility and it's not unreasonable (within the liberal economic paradigm) to speculate that a move which captures more utility as revenue could generate less total utility, especially when you bring high risk/reward financial modeling into valuation.
There are a lot of companies like you describe in the b2b generas. But services for consumers, especially those which are essentially communication services, seem to come up against this sell or grow pressure. I think twitter, Facebook, and many other services which sold at an earlier stage might have better served their "mission" as company's an order of magnitude smaller.
Think of the impact wikipedia (a nonprofit, but I think it's relevant) has had. How could that value possibly be represented by revenue or valuation. Twitter is now under tremendous pressure to create a hyper-profitable advertising business to rival Facebook & Google.
Twitter is now 4,000 employees and almost $2bn annual budget (growing at X 2.6 p/a) under pressure to turn twitter into a revenue machine within 12 months. They are employing armies of bizdev, ad sales and support to try and meet this goals. Does that kind of Twitter stand a better chance at value creation than an 800 employee Twitter with a $400k budget would have had?
In my book Twitter was never creating value and that's part of why they've never been profitable; I've been bearish on Twitter from day 1. But maybe I'm just being old and grouchy.
A lot of the ideas make sense from a certain perspective, even these incredible valuations and exits. There really is a chance to create or invest in the next Facebook. It's not a big chance, but the payoff is so big that it can fuel funding and building thousands of attempts.
One of the premises of this complexes is the idea that highly impactful businesses can be started fast and cheap leveraging the internet as a marketing and distribution channel, open source software, cheap computing power and other levers of these times. If they focus on building popular useful things, the scale can get so big that monetization is likely enough to come. That is, likely enough for the investors formulas.
But, what of businesses that become popular and useful and financially successful relative to the financial needs of running the business? Reddit. OKCupid. The proverbial Craigslist.
What if a business can employ 100 people comfortably, serve 100,000s of customers usefully and reward the founders to the tune of millions, but not billions. Can these exist? Can they last for decades? Generations?
Is it efficient to roll the dice on a hundred $10m per year businesses for the chance at one $10bn business. On paper it's a 10X improvement?
I'm not trying to ad my voice to the sour grapes tasting comments about valuations and such. I'm just wondering if we can let a million flowers bloom for a longer stretch, not just for their ability to win the big-or- go-home game.
I think I might be saying this backwards. Let me try it another way. A lot of the current startup thinking is premised on the idea that small teams can have a big impact relative to the cash requirements. A second idea is that a startup making a big impact has a decent chance of turning into a multi billion dollar company or a $100m+ acquisition for a multi billion dollar company. Is there no room to build on the first premise without later building on the second premise? Could Facebook have connected people as well as a 500 person company?
This is a tangent to Fred Wilson's point, but I feel like it might boil down to a similar enquiry.