It's plausible that a rogue microcode update could be used to bypass TPM static-root-of-trust protections, though, and a microcode update could certainly bypass TXT's dynamic root of trust. This might enable a bootable USB stick that would load malicious microcode and then reboot warmly enough to preserve the microcode and then launch the OS with a TXT bypass.
Even so, I don't really see the point. So far, essentially every BIOS can be freely (or freely using an exploit) reflashed from kernel mode, and a new image could contain malicious SMM code, and SMM code can also bypass both static and dynamic roots of trust.
Tamper with AES and randomness instructions.
Plant a very obscure privilege escalation exploit. Given the prevalence of java, activex and google nacl, escaping sandboxes is a big thing.
Tamper with the MMU to make a certain software invisible.
If they had the opportunity, it's not unlikely they did something like this. Perhaps just in a directed attack. They've done extensive firmware patching in the past in you believe last year's leaks.
A more interesting question is whether they didn't have to, because they had a say in making the silicon in the first place. The risk is there, it's not crazy to see it. Even FreeBSD who was the last mainstream OS to use the randomness instructions unadultered doesn't do that anymore.
Modulo the microcode signature, flash is better locked down these days: Flash updates are typically arbitrated by the firmware (though that's also just one signature away), requiring a reboot, while microcode updates are still free for all (in ring0 - realtek already lost a driver signing key once, why not again?).
[1] http://www.syscan.org/index.php/download/get/6e597f6067493dd... [2] http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/30773.html
So yes, I'm quite aware of the immense set of faults in UEFI implementations (some of which are encouraged by UEFI's design, where more layers of UEFI are added to mitigate them).
But as an attacker I wouldn't want to assume that I run into any single of the many UEFI implementation quirks and adapt my attack to everyone of them.
And I really hope for Intel that Tianocore won't become an endless stream of portable UEFI security issues - otherwise the IBVs might get second thoughts about standardizing on a single codebase.
I'm guessing the private RSA keys are extremely well guarded, probably stored in a HSM that only allows signing, not key extraction, so that the keys cannot even be revealed to Intel.
On the other hand, who knows. There's certainly been cases of code signing keys on the loose (Adobe, etc) and even a compromised HSM host (Fedora, someone managed to sign compromised openssh .rpms)