Exactly. An analogy is with password salting: you don't salt passwords because it makes the hashes unbreakable, you do it to increase the amount of work attackers have to do to successfully recover the passwords.
Even without verified certificates, mandatory TLS would require a MITM attacker to be present at the time of the connection (not passively record traffic and attack later) for every connection they wanted to snoop on. For a stateless protocol like HTTP, that's a massive amount of work to do if you want to snoop on any large scale. The increase in work required is probably even greater (relatively) than the increase achieved in the example of password salting (which is considered a security no-brainer)!
Sure. But non-encryption leaves you vulnerable to both passive snooping and MITM.
> Setting HTTP/2 to encrypt everything but removing the big warnings that appear when trusted authenticity cannot be established would be a net security downgrade, because the lay user will trust their connection when they ought not.
How about only showing the padlock for certificated sites, and requiring a certificate when a secure request is made (http2s:// ?), but allowing encryption with a self-signed certificate for "insecure" URLs (http2://) and just not showing the padlock?