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Re:Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View by matthewmacleod on Wednesday August 06, 2014 @07:41AM (#8141968)
It's hard to see what benefit that would offer. Non-authenticated TLS is trivially vulnerable to MITM attacks. This is especially the case because I can't foresee a situation in which a website would put the effort in to implement opportunistic TLS, but not implement straightforward authenticated HTTPS…
Re:Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View by TazeTSchnitzel on Wednesday August 06, 2014 @07:49AM (#8141985)
It completely prevents passive surveillance, however. Sure, you can MITM, but the point is now to look at anything you have to do an MITM attack, unlike now, where most traffic is unencrypted and you can do surveillance passively. This makes surveillance more difficult. Net gain for everyone.
Re:Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View by matthewmacleod on Wednesday August 06, 2014 @08:21AM (#8142068)
I'll concede that passive surveillance would not be possible. However, I think that benefit is marginal - AFAIK, unencrypted support in HTTP2 is optional and won't be supported by browsers in any case.
Re:Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View by jessaustin on Wednesday August 06, 2014 @07:54AM (#8141996)
Non-authenticated TLS is trivially vulnerable to MITM attacks.

I don't think a well-implemented TOFU/POP policy would be "trivially vulnerable", but it would still accommodate self-signing. Standardizing this would have been a worthy goal for IETF.

Re:Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View by TazeTSchnitzel on Wednesday August 06, 2014 @08:00AM (#8142013)
I'd argue that even if it is MITM-vulnerable, it's still very useful, as it makes passive surveillance impossible.
Re:Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View by tmorton on Wednesday August 06, 2014 @09:25AM (#8142303)
This article has a great response to that argument: https://www.tbray.org/ongoing/When/201x/2014/07/28/Privacy-E...