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Re:Show HN: A Marketing Bot That Sells OpenStack Cloud Insta... by al2o3cr on Tuesday July 22, 2014 @07:10PM (#8072103)
I didn't see anything in the TXT whitepaper about securing programs run by a hypervisor against attacks by the hypervisor. Seems more focused on making sure that managed VMs can't compromise their neighbors or do side-channely things.

If I provide your VM with a simulated "TPM" that actually emails me the private keys, how is that supposed to be secure?

Re:Show HN: A Marketing Bot That Sells OpenStack Cloud Insta... by mike_hearn on Wednesday July 23, 2014 @07:34AM (#8073764)
The TPM is un-simulatable, that's the purpose of it.

The hypervisor is included in the remote attestation. The theory is, if you trust the signing keys used in the TPM (i.e. Intel/the hardware), then you can get a message from the remote computer that attests what code is running including the hypervisor. Thus you can conclude that the remote environment is safe against all but quite sophisticated hardware attackers (assuming a modern setup where you can lock cache lines and the TPM is integrated with the northbridge).

Re:Show HN: A Marketing Bot That Sells OpenStack Cloud Insta... by liam8841 on Tuesday July 22, 2014 @08:31PM (#8072319)
If I understand rightly, this sort of security is impossible until fully homomorphic encryption is invented. Any actual cryptos available to comment?