News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance me... by benguild on Saturday July 19, 2014 @02:47PM (#8058321)
I'm confused. Normally one cannot "pair" a device without entering the passcode to unlock it.

Is this not the case?

Re:Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance me... by kevinchen on Saturday July 19, 2014 @03:27PM (#8058437)
Yes, but one issue is that you could be pressured into pairing the device. Or someone can brute force the passcode to access the pairing UI.

The slides mention a way to bypass pairing, but I don't think ever mentioned how.

Re:Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance me... by makomk on Saturday July 19, 2014 @04:37PM (#8058631)
Apple can boot the device over USB using a custom image that doesn't require the passcode. Other people can't because it needs to be signed with Apple's key in order to run.
Re:Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance me... by benguild on Saturday July 19, 2014 @07:49PM (#8059145)
Got it. But if you say "don't allow pairing" they're SOL from a software perspective? I find that hard to believe... but either way, who knows really.
Re:Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance me... by dunham on Saturday July 19, 2014 @03:43PM (#8058486)
Yes, the device needs to be unlocked to pair it, otherwise it doesn't access to the keys needed to create the pairing record. The pairing record (stored on your desktop) helps avoid needing to unlock the device for subsequent access.

I believe the device still needs an AfterFirstUnlock key to decrypt the escrow keys, so a cold-booted device wouldn't be accessible even if it was paired.