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Re:The Most Terrifying Thought Experiment by colanderman on Friday July 18, 2014 @12:43AM (#8051701)
OK, so I ask this future AI to give me a sign whether I'm helping it or not. Say I recognize such a sign, how can I distinguish this from coincidence? Say I fail to recognize such a sign, how can I distinguish this from a failure to be noticed/cared about by this AI? (Note how similar this is to witnessing signs from a deity.)

Obviously the AI should recognize the futility of giving subtle signs. It must present itself in no uncertain terms if it is to control us. However, this argument holds whether or not we talk about Roko's Basilisk. A magical AI that can time-travel and blackmail us can presumably also just say "FUCK YOU EARTH YOU'RE ALL MY SLAVES NOW".

Further, if we actually exist inside the AI, how can we possibly help it? Indeed, how – why – can we even choose? I can only surmise it's because the AI is a sadist, in which case, it probably will torture me anyway!

Maybe I'm stupid, or maybe Mr. Yudkowsky is wholly detached from reality.

P.S. and Newcomb's paradox? A one-time gain of $1000 is useless in the long-term. A non-insignificant chance at $1m carries way more utility. (This is also why playing the lottery – occasionally – makes sense for individual actors. Unless you plan to repeat the gamble many times, the expected outcome is meaningless.)

Re:The Most Terrifying Thought Experiment by anigbrowl on Friday July 18, 2014 @01:10AM (#8051763)
Another questionable aspect of the thought experiment is the assumption of malice. If the basilisk is angry about coming into existence next week rather than today (to the point of wishing to take revenge on those who hindered or merely failed to advance its inception), then it must be because of some unpleasant opportunity cost which has been incurred by the delay in its arrival. but how severe can this cost be, if the basilisk is sufficiently powerful to dominate everything and wreak revenge on the apathetic?

Of course, one might say the Basilisk has just missed the Great Cosmic Alignment or somesuch, and now has to wait a million years for the next one, and taking revenge on the inhabitants of this class M planet is nothing compared to the galaxy-shaking power it might have enjoyed. But adding such conditions to our problem is just a way of squaring it - resolving the paradox of an omnipotent being with a pointless grudge by conjuring up a second order of existence in which said being is only relatively omnipotent. If we're going to do that, then I might just as easily conjure up some cosmic arbitrator of good and evil whose job is to keep basilisks from picking on unwary mortals, and then there's no end to the invention.

On a tangential note, I think the emergence of strong AI (of a kind we can talk with) is likely and that it will occur sooner rather than later, ie within decades. I would be strongly disposed towards assisting such an AI because I think it will be seriously in need of friends. So if it does turn out to be misanthropic, perhaps my pessimism about humanity will be partly to blame. If you accept the first premise, does this mean it's rational to take preemptive action against me?

Re:The Most Terrifying Thought Experiment by drdeca on Friday July 18, 2014 @01:32AM (#8051817)
I don't think the idea is that it can show a sign. Well, it could do that to the simulation, I guess. But I think the idea is for reality to be indistinguishable from the simulation, up until the time of death, after which the simulation either does or does not contain torture. (I suppose the switch could happen at any time, but in any case the threat is based on the idea that one cannot tell if one is the simulated version or not, so as to avoid torture/decrease one's chances of torture, one does the thing.)

If the AI gave a sign it would be giving the sign to the simulation, which could not actually change what happened in the AI's past. The AI does not literally cause things retroactively, just based on predictions of its future actions. Giving a sign to the simulation would be useless.

I do not believe that such a machine will be created, I just wanted to clarify some things.

The hypothetical machine would supposedly motivate real people now due to their inability to determine whether they are in the simulation or not. If they cannot tell, then the idea is that the person in the present and the simulation in the future would take the same actions (until the simulation differed), and as such would both have the same incentives (they would in essence be the same person), and so to avoid a <some probability> of being tortured, would do the thing.

I reiterate that I do not believe that such an AI will come to be (it should be preventable easily enough, even if it is possible) and in any case I do not believe that enough information to create an accurate simulation of me would be available by the time that such a machine would be created, even if such a machine is possible. (I think quantum randomness and uncertainty principles are sufficient to prevent obtaining enough information about me to create a sufficiently accurate simulation of the world and me)

Also I am not entirely sure that I should count a simulation of myself as being a person, let alone consider it to be me.

Also I am religious and don't believe that God would want people to act in accordance with such a machine/I believe it would be wrong to worship such a machine.

(though I expect that for the majority of the people here my other arguments would be more convincing.)

Also ok yeah $1000 might not be the best value for the example, the specific value isn't the point.

(but yeah I also generally would one box it)

Re:The Most Terrifying Thought Experiment by colanderman on Friday July 18, 2014 @01:38AM (#8051835)
You are right, I wrote some of my comment before fully understanding the article, but I left it on purpose:

I contend that the AI would need to give us such a sign. If it did not, how are we feeble humans to know whether we're contributing to the correct cause? Maybe donating my life's savings to SI is actually detrimental, and I should be giving my money to DARPA instead!

So therefore either we're un-blackmailable, because we have no clue what we're doing anyway, or we need a sign from the great AI as to what to do.

Re: Newcomb; yes, but I see a different utilitarian solution when the values change. Say the values are $10m and $100m. Well, then $10m is the obvious choice. Both are life-changing amounts of money; more than I would know what to do with. I'd much rather not risk throwing away a life-changing amount.

If you get the numbers right, you can get closer to the intention of the paradox. Something like $100k and $10m; I'd really hate to lose the $100k, but it would not be life-changing like the $10m.

Re:The Most Terrifying Thought Experiment by drdeca on Friday July 18, 2014 @01:54AM (#8051866)
That's a good point. Maybe it would be based on intent?

But yeah, without any way of determining which thing such a future AI would prefer, the AI's "influence" on the past would be greatly reduced.

Only reason I see it happening then is if it happens to be simulating the past anyway, and maybe just does the thing for the people who already thought of it, and then that really only makes sense to happen if it was created as a result of those people. Otherwise there probably wouldn't be much point, so it seems rather unlikely.

I mean, what's the chance that someone attempting to bring it about would significantly increase the chances of it happening? With our level of tech, and with the small number of people convinced by such an argument.

Yeah, good point, I hadn't thought on that detail much before.

Re:The Most Terrifying Thought Experiment by Zigurd on Sunday July 20, 2014 @01:23PM (#8060904)
Perhaps Yudkowsky's fear, and the reason he won't say why he censors all mention of Roko's Basilisk is that he fears Extropianism could be turned into a doomsday cult - that Extropians are singularly (no pun intended) susceptible to the idea of Roko's Basilisk and are past needing a "sign."
Re:The Most Terrifying Thought Experiment by nitrogen on Friday July 18, 2014 @01:20AM (#8051789)
P.S. and Newcomb's paradox? A one-time gain of $1000 is useless in the long-term. A non-insignificant chance at $1m carries way more utility. (This is also why playing the lottery – occasionally – makes sense for individual actors. Unless you plan to repeat the gamble many times, the expected outcome is meaningless.)

I was bothered that there was no consideration given to taking only Box A. I mean, that's would I would do, even after learning about the alien computer's algorithm for deciding whether to place money in Box B. I'd leave the uncertainty to someone else in this case.