Re:Diffie-Hellman key exchange, explained using colors
by oleganza on Friday July 11, 2014 @01:34AM
(#8019004)
Nick Szabo suggested to leave small holes unplugged:
http://blog.oleganza.com/post/69174500046/leaving-small-hole...
Re:Diffie-Hellman key exchange, explained using colors
by shinigami on Friday July 11, 2014 @07:41AM
(#8019641)
NSA approves.
Re:Diffie-Hellman key exchange, explained using colors
by colordrops on Thursday July 10, 2014 @05:52PM
(#8017580)
Meeting in person is vulnerable to hollywood makeup and scopolamine attacks.
Re:Diffie-Hellman key exchange, explained using colors
by rosser on Thursday July 10, 2014 @02:53PM
(#8016454)
Hence key-signing parties. People are still doing those, aren't they?
Re:Diffie-Hellman key exchange, explained using colors
by prezjordan on Thursday July 10, 2014 @10:41PM
(#8018620)
We did one last semester at my school's cybersecurity club. I don't really know much about cybersecurity, just a hobbyist, but I had a fun time nerding out and giving freshmen a tough time with their drivers licenses.
Re:Diffie-Hellman key exchange, explained using colors
by stcredzero on Thursday July 10, 2014 @07:06PM
(#8017903)
Someone needs to write fiction about bringing rufies to a key signing party.
Re:Diffie-Hellman key exchange, explained using colors
by privong on Thursday July 10, 2014 @07:38PM
(#8018035)
xkcd 364 is close: https://xkcd.com/364/
Re:Diffie-Hellman key exchange, explained using colors
by BuildTheRobots on Friday July 11, 2014 @08:54PM
(#8023307)
Or using SAS [1] and PGP check words [2] ala implementations like ZRTP [1]
edit: I realize the salient point is that this gives you assurance that the encryption handshake hasn't be intercepted but no guarantee as to the identity of the person you've connected to. With real-time VoIP this potentially isn't a problem (yet) as it's relatively obvious who you're chatting to on the phone.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZRTP#SAS [2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PGP_word_list
The only way around it? Some other method of verifying the key, which isn't vulnerable to a MITM, like meeting in person, or using Certificate Authorities.