There were probably other reasons for the differential treatment (the scope of the Diginotar hack was bigger, for example), but I think that a lot of them are essentially strong correlates of the disclosure policy (i.e. if you have other responsible security practices, you're more likely to have a good disclosure policy).
For example fines, changes to procedures, mandatory security audits, agreeing not to issue certain types of certificate etc - the CA is going to do their best to comply if the alternative is to be put out of business.
Whether we want browser vendors / an industry standards committee to have that much power is another matter, of course.
Unfortunately there's no real procedure you can put in place to prevent hacking, as the NSA discovered to their cost.
If we told people "no matter who swindles you, we'll make you whole", everybody would invest in ponzi schemes.
You'd be punishing a lot of people because they don't know better for something that really should be built into dns and http.
Doing it this way is actually a good way to handle product differentiation, because generally people won't make browsing choices based on certificate brand name, but commercial website owners will choose a better CA if it means that CA is less likely to get de-certified.