This is quite similar to DANE mentioned in the sibling, except that it doesn’t directly tie into the DNS and instead just merges the two organisations. Vendors could then either ship the root CA and/or each TLD certificate. Even when one NIC gets compromised, all it can do then is issue wrongful certificates for that given TLD (and rogue/untrusted ones are restricted to their namespace). There is still a SPOF in the “root” CA issuing TLD certs, but at least there is only one instead of 100 or so in the form of all root CAs plus the hundreds of intermediate CAs which, in theory, can issue certs for any domain just as well at the moment. Since it’s been a while that I heard of a case where TLD nameservers got wrongfully replaced in the root zone, this seems to be reasonable safe organisation.
You can not separate those concepts. If you don't have proof of identity, your connection is not secure.
>Despite the scary red screens browsers like to show it's never the case that you're less secure using https to talk to a given server, even if the certificate the server presents is expired, mislabeled, or even entirely forged.
But I completely agree with that, there should be warnings for plain HTTP, with the same severity used for self-signed sites. (And current browsers are too severe with self-signed certs, to the point that they reduce the security of people accessing those sites.)
The ux [especially] places priority of identity ahead of protected, private conversation and then too broadly encapsulates that information. Secondly, verification is too static, too binary (all or nothing), and too optimistic.
1. To what degree is the line leaky and observable? 2. To what degree are we confirming the conversation participants' identity claims? 3. To what degree is the conversion following normal conversation protocol?
CAs have been name constrained in the past, see the update here about ANSSI: http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2013/12/further-imp...
Oh, certainly they do. Name constraints work just like that: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10
So does Extended Key Usage in practice, although it's not defined that way.
There are some platforms where name constraints aren't implemented, but CAPI (Windows) certainly does implement it and I believe that NSS does also.