News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by kylec on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @01:32PM (#8005634)
Once again, demonstration that the CA model is broken. Why does it make sense for any CA to be able to issue certificates for any domain?
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by rakoo on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @03:07PM (#8006140)
I'd say it's not the CA model itself that's broken; it's the way we use these CAs that is too static to account for inevitable breaches in security.

There is no easy way to add or remove a CA from our trusted sets. There is no way for a server to send multiple signatures to the client, so the client can choose any CA he actually trusts and silently discard the bad CAs.

There is no problem in having any CA issue a certificate for any domain; the problem is that we have to trust these CAs and we can't move fast enough.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by jorangreef on Wednesday July 09, 2014 @03:58AM (#8008543)
Sending multiple signatures and relying on a quorum of CAs might be a great solution.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by jonny_eh on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @01:34PM (#8005650)
What would the solution be?
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by richardwhiuk on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @01:36PM (#8005668)
DANE TLSA is probably the best current option.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by AlyssaRowan on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @07:05PM (#8007228)
On that note, it's worth taking a look at https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nygren-service-bindings-00 - the "B" record, which is in a very early speculative draft. One shot among several at gluing this stuff together.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by peterwwillis on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @03:28PM (#8006262)
A) Have the initial connection give the client all the domain verification info it needs for the future. Now secure connections can be established with or without a CA. Upside: independence, only one time you can exploit the connection. Downside: anyone can mitm the connection forever from the first connect onwards.

B) Use a third party to register the information to secure the initial connection. This is what CAs were created for, and now people are suggesting DNS (and I would wager somebody might recommend whois at some point) as central trusted authorities for this data. Upside: no initial connection mitm, attack surface is minimized compared to number of CAs, distributed model. Downside: still a 3rd-party central authority, and due to smaller attack surface one successful attack could have much wider-ranging consequences, and it adds complication.

C) Decentralized network of 3rd party peers to share authority information. Upside: decentralized, loosely organized, requires a bigger attack surface to disable. Downside: peers not held to as high a security standard, not necessarily businesses so no guarantees of integrity.

D) Require the user get out-of-bounds information to verify the integrity of initial connection, and after that any connection between the source and destination is secured in any number of ways. Upside: total security not dependent on 3rd parties, no man in the middle. Downside: incredibly inconvenient and totally unscalable.

E) All of the above. Support all possible schemes and allow the domain and the users to determine which of them they will use. Layer all different forms of verification so that the number of successful exploits to achieve a fake cert is so complicated that only a few dedicated state actors or elite hackers would spend enough time on it to be successful. Upside: users have choice, domain owners have choice, increased security overall. Downside: browsers have to figure out how to explain to the users what the fuck is going on when they get a warning about a cert now.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by me1010 on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @04:23PM (#8006565)
The problem is that a CA is issuing two things:

1. An identity.

2. A secure communications certificate.

These do not need to be the same thing or issued by the same entity. I propose to modify the system as follows:

1. Register a domain name using an email address and a PGP key.

2. The registrar verifies that the applicant has the private key by requiring a clicked link in an encrypted mail.

3. A phone number is required for "full trust".

4. Thus with a private PGP key and a phone, trust that the applicant is the applicant has been established. It really doesn't matter who or what that applicant is -- just that the applicant and only that applicant has the required items.

5. The registrar passes the public key and the top domain to DNS servers. DNS validates against the registrar. And trust in the domain as an entity is now established.

6. Secure communications with the domain can now be established through the use of certs issued by the top level domain. And the domain becomes it's own authority.

Any changes to registrar/domain information requires decrypting an email and answering a phone. Expensive and compromised CA's go away - Domain records become secure - Trust becomes decentralized - And domain owners hold all the keys... The only thing anyone else has is the domain holder's public key... SSL itself remains in place as is...

Sure, if you lose your private key - you're screwed -- but that's just owning up being a responsible domain owner.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by marcosdumay on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @10:04PM (#8007738)
Basically, TLS over DNSSEC.

Yes, it's better because you now only trust one party [1] what's much better than 600 random companies around the world. But it's not a panacea, that still puts too much power into governments hands, and still relies too much on a third party that can be hacked, bribed, threatened.

I'd still like it better if browsers pinned the key of every site I access, and issued a warning if it changed without the new key being signed with the old.

[1] Ok, a few, because you don't contact ICANN directly when you get a domain.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by peterwwillis on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @10:07PM (#8007744)
First off, a phone call is not full trust. A copy of your driver's license, power bills, social security card, etc are closer to full trust.

Second, all you've described is a certificate authority that works inside DNS. Instead of a CA validating your certificate and the client blindly believing whatever the CA tells it, now it's the DNS validating your PGP key and the client blindly believing whatever DNS tells it. It's the same, only now you've got more eggs in one basket to get owned.

So no, any changes to DNS do not require any key from a domain owner. If the client implicitly trusts the DNS it means the DNS can make any change it wants and the client will believe it. This is the whole reason nobody likes the CA model, because the CA can decide at any time to issue a certificate for any domain and any client will just blindly believe it.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by me1010 on Wednesday July 09, 2014 @07:42AM (#8009099)
You misunderstand.

You're defining trust as trust that the entity is who the entity claims to be in societal space. But this is unnecessary. All that needs to be trusted is that the claimed domain owner is the domain owner. It doesn't matter who that entity is in societal space - just cryptographic space.

Each domain is its own CA. And the registrar doesn't need to be trusted at all. All it is doing is dolling out domain names to public keys. There is no need for "true" personal identity to be established - since the only entity that can decrypt the PGP encrypted verification email is the owner of the associated private key.

I've drawn a very rough diagram for you... http://s26.postimg.org/daz5u1izd/replacement_CA.png

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by peterwwillis on Wednesday July 09, 2014 @09:33AM (#8009511)
No, I understand PKI. What you've created is less secure than what we have now.

If computer A wants to connect securely to computer B, and it doesn't want its connection to be MITM'd, computer A trusts a 3rd party (computer C) to tell it that computer B is really computer B and not a fake. If you take over the DNS system (which is your version of computer C in my example) you get to write anything to computer A and it will believe it.

The whole idea behind a MITM is that an attacker controls communication between A and B, and ideally also controls communication between A and C. Just controlling the network isn't enough to subvert the connection, though, because an attacker would need to control one of A, B, or C.

If you are the NSA, and you write up a very nice National Security Letter and go to computer C and say "make a fake DNS record for me, because terrorism," you now get to write blank checks for yourself and computers A and B have effectively no idea that their connection is now subject to MITM.

Specifically to exploit your system all you'd need to do is create a fake A record pointing to computer D, and a fake public key record which matches the PGP key and SSL cert of computer D. If you weren't using DNSSEC you could do this on a regular open wireless network with no extra hacking needed. If you are using DNSSEC (and a mandatory validating stub resolver, which Windows doesn't ship with) you'd need to take over the root DNS servers or the registrar which feeds records to the .com. root DNS servers. But the NSA can do all that. Probably others too.

So, again, it's the exact same state we're in with the CAs, with the exception that DNS would be less secure because the client (computer A) doesn't have any public keys/ca certs stored on it to verify the DNS servers or domains against.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by me1010 on Wednesday July 09, 2014 @10:08AM (#8009671)
In order to create a fake record, you would need to replace the PGP ID on the registrar's record. In order to that, you'd need to intercept and decrypt a PGP encrypted email. In order to do that you need to be in possession of the private key and have the passphrase. An attacker could steal the private key from the domain owner's computer [not the server] and install a keylogger to get the passphrase ... or an attacker could produce a private key from a public key... good luck with that one...

The system I've laid out would be significantly more secure and less spoof-able than the current system. Further, DNSSEC becomes entirely unnecessary...

Also, it is entirely possible to create a registrar which would store all user record data in an encrypted store which could also be encrypted using a domain owner provided public key... if this were added to the architecture, no government entity could modify anything regarding a domain - except replacement of the entire record.

Of course, since the entire system current and any possible future Internet relies upon computers and networks that are explicitly not under the control of the content provider - any government can at any time break the system... This is always going to be true of any and every system of wide networks.

EDIT: Computer A and B need a third entity C to validate A to B and B to A. True... However, this does not need to be a computer -- it could very well be a cryptographically generated unique ID... In my example "C" is the PGP ID. However, it could be any cryptographic item that is tied to the domain record and only modifiable using the private key that generated the unique cryptographic item... for example, it could be a bit coin address.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by peterwwillis on Wednesday July 09, 2014 @11:49AM (#8010273)
> Of course, since the entire system current and any possible future Internet relies upon computers and networks that are explicitly not under the control of the content provider - any government can at any time break the system... This is always going to be true of any and every system of wide networks.

This is the entire reason we are trying to get away from CAs! What we have works perfectly fine. The only reason anyone wants to get away from it is to prevent state actors from overriding a CA's authority. If you want to just reinvent the wheel with the DNS system, use RFC 6698.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by me1010 on Wednesday July 09, 2014 @03:01PM (#8011565)
My idea was a thought project, and I was not aware of RFC 6698. Thanks for the reading material, it sounds similar to my thought process...

However, my personal reasons to discard the current CA system is to enable secure communications from multiple subdomains without the need to pay a $500 rental fee for a wildcard identity+cert --- As well as enable secure passwordless access to A/MX records without fear of compromise.

The government is going to be able to break any system that's put out there. At the very least, a government can disrupt IP traffic in and out of a node. There is always going to be an open addressing scheme, unless the network is an encrypted peer-to-peer network with every node attempting to decrypt every packet... I seem to remember reading about a block chain peer-to-peer data network being developed. However, my guess is that overhead bandwidth limitations will be a problem for large networks.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by exo762 on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @02:29PM (#8005939)
Convergence by Moxie Marlinspike. Some argue that it does worse then CA in protecting against low-profile phishing attacks, but that's just bollocks.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by wyager on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @01:35PM (#8005662)
A distributed secure key-value system a la Namecoin.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by uwutnope on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @03:25PM (#8006232)
You have to store the blockchain on your computer to be able to browse website securely via namecoin, if you use 'light wallets' you will end up with the same DNS as today (trust a third party DNS server + CA or Namecoin node). You could use http://convergence.io/ type of idea to connect to two trusted Namecoin nodes but do we really expect the average user to keep a list of trusted nodes?
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by ryan-c on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @06:33PM (#8007092)
If you only want to be able to resolve against Namecoin, it's possible to build a client that stores only the unspent transaction output set for names and a few dozen recent blocks and full security.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by uwutnope on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @08:12PM (#8007442)
How does that scale in filesize if Namecoin had 215 million~ domain names like we have in the current ICANN system? Also, what would the solution be for smartphones, downloading even just a few blocks isn't preferable with phone networks.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by wyager on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @04:57PM (#8006714)
You can have trustless namecoin without storing the blockchain, using techniques like SPV.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by uwutnope on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @08:18PM (#8007465)
According to https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Thin_Client_Security SPV relies on the trust of your ISP. When nodes send you the blockchain data, is that an encrypted transfer or open to MITM?
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by rakoo on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @03:09PM (#8006148)
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by ryan-c on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @06:36PM (#8007107)
okTurtles is one of several middleware options that runs on top of Namecoin, implementing the domain record spec. It advocates using someone else's trusted server as a data source, but does not at this time implement any integrity protection for data in transit.

http://www.freespeechme.org/ is a more mature and more secure.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by rakoo on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @06:57PM (#8007199)
> It advocates using someone else's trusted server as a data source

Wrong; it advocates using your own server, but proposes public servers for tests. Here's an excerpt of the README:

    DNSChain is meant to be run by individuals!

    Yes, you can use a public DNSChain server, but it's far  
    better to use your own because it gives you more 
    privacy, makes you more resistant to censorship, and 
    provides you with a stronger guarantee that the 
    responses you get haven't been tampered with by a 
    malicious server.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by ryan-c on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @07:14PM (#8007261)
I must have either misremembered or it has been changed since I last looked, then.

It is still the case that using DNSChain will not get you validated SSL for .bit domains without additional software. It can serve DANE records, but the browser won't verify them and the existing browser extensions for adding DANE support require DNSSEC which DNSChain does not provide.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by itistoday2 on Monday July 14, 2014 @03:36PM (#8032749)
> It is still the case that using DNSChain will not get you validated SSL for .bit domains without additional software.

Yes, just like FreeSpeechMe it the SSL validation will initially work via a browser extension, but unlike FSM (heh) it does not carry the additional baggage of requiring you to run a Namecoin node on your [phone/laptop/etc.].

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by Qantourisc on Wednesday July 09, 2014 @03:50AM (#8008527)
DNS Dane, SSL singing with 2 CA's, peer-based trust, SSL pinning. We probably need a mix ... and none seems to be ideal.

What would help is be more ruthless when CA's mess up, and no the pussy approach we are using now: do nothing.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by leccine on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @04:10PM (#8006500)
Exactly. It does not make any freakin sense, yet people are banging on implementation details like which cypher is better like you could not circumvent the entire process with a cert signed by a compromised CA.
[deleted]
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by claudius on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @01:54PM (#8005756)
Tie it to the DNS. Globally, there is one root CA which is authorised to only issue certificates for ?. Then, each top-level registry (DENIC, Nominet etc.) get a certificate from this CA which allows them to issue certificates on ?.tld.

This is quite similar to DANE mentioned in the sibling, except that it doesn’t directly tie into the DNS and instead just merges the two organisations. Vendors could then either ship the root CA and/or each TLD certificate. Even when one NIC gets compromised, all it can do then is issue wrongful certificates for that given TLD (and rogue/untrusted ones are restricted to their namespace). There is still a SPOF in the “root” CA issuing TLD certs, but at least there is only one instead of 100 or so in the form of all root CAs plus the hundreds of intermediate CAs which, in theory, can issue certs for any domain just as well at the moment. Since it’s been a while that I heard of a case where TLD nameservers got wrongfully replaced in the root zone, this seems to be reasonable safe organisation.

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by femto113 on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @02:54PM (#8006077)
There's a fundamental flaw with the "CA/DNS/HTTPS/web browser UI" infrastructure that conflated the concepts of "encrypted transmission" and "proof of identity". Despite the scary red screens browsers like to show it's never the case that you're less secure using https to talk to a given server, even if the certificate the server presents is expired, mislabeled, or even entirely forged. Regardless of the encryption there are many ways to fool you into believing the server you're talking to belongs to some other entity, CA's were supposed to address that but they are consistently failing at this both by accident and indifference as well as hacking. These concerns need to be separated. I believe the end game is for servers to generate their own certificates for encrypted communication, and ultimately it will have to be some extension to DNS to handle the proof of identity, but I don't see an obvious evolution from the existing CA system.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by marcosdumay on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @10:09PM (#8007751)
> There's a fundamental flaw ... that conflated the concepts of "encrypted transmission" and "proof of identity".

You can not separate those concepts. If you don't have proof of identity, your connection is not secure.

>Despite the scary red screens browsers like to show it's never the case that you're less secure using https to talk to a given server, even if the certificate the server presents is expired, mislabeled, or even entirely forged.

But I completely agree with that, there should be warnings for plain HTTP, with the same severity used for self-signed sites. (And current browsers are too severe with self-signed certs, to the point that they reduce the security of people accessing those sites.)

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by jlcummings on Wednesday July 09, 2014 @06:35AM (#8008932)
This.

The ux [especially] places priority of identity ahead of protected, private conversation and then too broadly encapsulates that information. Secondly, verification is too static, too binary (all or nothing), and too optimistic.

1. To what degree is the line leaky and observable? 2. To what degree are we confirming the conversation participants' identity claims? 3. To what degree is the conversion following normal conversation protocol?

Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by richardwhiuk on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @02:23PM (#8005917)
Another alternative would be to restrict which TLDs a CA can issue for - e.g. China's CA would only be able to issue .chn domains etc.
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by agl on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @01:46PM (#8005720)
Name constraints apply all the way down the chain - intermediates are implicitly limited by the constraints on their root.

CAs have been name constrained in the past, see the update here about ANSSI: http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2013/12/further-imp...

[deleted]
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by agl on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @01:58PM (#8005779)
A Chrome update was needed because the constraint was applied retrospectively. A name constraint is usually an X.509 extension that is included in the certificate.
[deleted]
Re:Maintaining digital certificate security by agl on Tuesday July 08, 2014 @02:29PM (#8005938)
> Every time you visit a page the OS/browser doesn't go up the entire chain of trust and check for constraints.

Oh, certainly they do. Name constraints work just like that: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.10

So does Extended Key Usage in practice, although it's not defined that way.

There are some platforms where name constraints aren't implemented, but CAPI (Windows) certainly does implement it and I believe that NSS does also.