1. Make the entire site available under `ssl.washingtonpost.com` (ideally without the `.ssl` prefix).
That way, the domain won't be as suspicious as it is right now. I suspect that this is more or less the only content hosted on the domain.
2. Include an iframe for all (or a random subset of) visitors, loading this particular url (hidden).
By artificially generating traffic to the endpoint it will be harder to distinguish these from other, 'real' requests.
Use a random delay for adding the iframe (otherwise the 'pairing' with the initial http request may distinguish this traffic).
3. Print the link, url and info block on the dead trees (the paper), as other has suggested.
4. Add HSTS headers (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security)
Or, since the content of this page is mostly text, it could be included in the HTML of all washingtonpost.com home page requests with very small overhead, and shown with a non-tracked javascript action (link/button), so it is all client-side and indistinguishable from a normal request to the home page.
We're working on a best practices guide for deployments [0]. I'll make sure these suggestions go in there. Feel free to take a look and comment if you're interested!
[0] https://securedrop.hackpad.com/SecureDrop-Deployment-Best-Pr...
Print it in the physical newspaper. The German computer magazine c't prints their PGP key fingerprints in the masthead.
You could put the instructions on pages that many people visit regularly, true security through obscurity. For example, put the instructions in abbreviated form in a box in the footer of your front page (or in the footer of every page).
This may be one of the rare cases where the use of a QR Code is justified.
I'm not sure how we could explain to avoid it - where would the explanation go? Visiting that page would be just as much of a correlation, no? It's kind of a chicken and egg problem, unless the source is already using Tor.
Avoiding the "trail of the SSL connection" also suggests we should be doing something to combat website fingerprinting, which we have discussed but do not have a clear solution for yet.
Our current thinking is that just visiting the landing page is not enough to prosecute a source. We can do better, and are working on it, but it's difficult.