Once it was made apparent just what the capabilities were, and how strongly the NSA was utilizing those capabilities, minds started to change.
To my knowledge, 20 years ago Russian security agencies were trying to inspect in depth any foreign computer hardware (as there is no other computer hardware existed back then or even today in Russia) that they were buying. Not that one is able to seriously inspect beyond the level of the plastic body of a chip, yet they tried at least :)
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=semiconductor+decapsulation
The fact that these techniques do work fairly well for semiconductor reverse engineering is a reason that recent research on "stealthy dopant-level hardware Trojans" was scary.
http://www.iacr.org/workshops/ches/ches2013/presentations/CH...
Though maybe that's what your reference to the inability to "seriously" inspect chips refers to. :-)
This research produces optically indistinguishable ICs with different electrical properties, which hinders optical reverse engineering.
My impression is that there's still a semiconductor device reverse engineering technique which likely defeats this measure (FIB imaging)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focused_ion_beam
as well as some other microscopy techniques that might conceivably detect these differences, but that it's more difficult and expensive overall compared to optical imaging.
https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/508
So maybe the dopants have to get even stealthier if they're to avoid expert semiconductor reverse engineers. :-)
Also the Russians are traditionally quite good at reverse engeneering ;-) and they _did_ have their own domestic chips 20 years ago.
No. Not back then, not now. There hasn't been a chip there able to run Word/Excel/email. The best "native" chips are the 30 year old ones, with some updates, in the anti-ICBM systems.
If you want to avoid balkaniztion, relying on trust will not work. Trust is dead.
They know that we know that they know. heh.
That does nothing to prevent the leakage of metadata. Who talked to who, when, and how long. You can encrypt the call, but not the number. You can encrypt the email, but not the headers. You have to trust the system routing the requests.
Anyway, whatever provider they go with, they should encrypt point-to-point, and thus provider isn't really important. One can't argue though with the God-given right of the national telecom to exploit the hysteria to kick foreign competitor off the fat government contracts :)
The wave of partitioning and protectionism happening in the Internet and other global networks (like Russia trying to build their own VISA style pay system and national/government supported search engine) starts to remind about global trade partitioning leading to and through the Great Depression.