Re:How to Swiftly Destroy a $370 Million Dollar Rocket with ...
by dalke on Thursday June 26, 2014 @07:45AM
(#7949105)
"The decision to cease the processor" was an explicit design decision by humans, who assumed that the analysis of the software was sufficient to be able to assume that an exception was caused by a hardware error instead of a software one. This was valid ... for Ariane IV. "Don't terminate the process on integer overflow" is not allowed by the specification.
It's incorrect to attribute the problem to an overflow exception. Rather, it's equally correct to say that it was a design fault (because that functionality simply wasn't needed for Ariane V) or an analysis fault (because the overflow could have been detected that way) or a testing fault (because testing with simulated Ariane V inputs would have revealed the fault).
If there was a random hardware failure in SR-2 then a shutdown, to only use SR-1 would have been fine. But SR-1 was subject to the same failure condition, because it used the same code. So it's equally valid to say that the failure was in not using two independent implementations, as a mitigation for simple coding errors.
Hence the report says the problem was "due to specification and design errors in the software of the inertial reference system", and does not place the blame only on the triggering event. It's also why "confining exceptions to tasks" is only half of one of the 14 recommendations.
It's incorrect to attribute the problem to an overflow exception. Rather, it's equally correct to say that it was a design fault (because that functionality simply wasn't needed for Ariane V) or an analysis fault (because the overflow could have been detected that way) or a testing fault (because testing with simulated Ariane V inputs would have revealed the fault).
If there was a random hardware failure in SR-2 then a shutdown, to only use SR-1 would have been fine. But SR-1 was subject to the same failure condition, because it used the same code. So it's equally valid to say that the failure was in not using two independent implementations, as a mitigation for simple coding errors.
Hence the report says the problem was "due to specification and design errors in the software of the inertial reference system", and does not place the blame only on the triggering event. It's also why "confining exceptions to tasks" is only half of one of the 14 recommendations.