But that doesn't mean they gain anything from infiltrating a large number of CAs; after all, those only sign certificates, not create the private keys.
It's fairly well documented if you google around.
And note, while it may seem like a terrible thing, it really isn't. The issue isn't that they're able to do it, the issue is how rigorous they are with their process of deciding to do it.
There is absolutely a valid reason for the government to want to do this.
A, creating rogue cert by md5 collisions (they have the capacity) B, making people believe that a CA guarantees the identity of the issuer, while having their CA in the approved list so they can sign certs (for example like gmail.com)
There is good documentation about it:
If they did want to sign something publicly, they'd just compromise some third-world CA and have them take the blame. There's plenty of them in there.
Or they could just sign up as a Comodo reseller.