Yes, a secure erase of the entire disk. That does not help with erasing the free space (a free-space wipe). Erasing the free space can't be done purely at the controller level since the controller can't tell which blocks are free and which used.
"Pointless" was too strong. "Not secure" would have been better.
EDIT--
More specifically, most utils don't tell you that they don't touch slack space unless you search the forums. See, for example, CCleaner which lists a few limitations of CCleaner's free space wipe, but which makes no mention of slack space.
Thing is, that depends on the filesystem. I know that the usual shred commands don't work all that great on Ext4 due to journalling and such, but Microsoft actually provides[1] a first party tool to do it on NTFS (at the file level) to handle those edge cases.
Apple provides[2] a built-in free space nuking tool as well.
That leaves sector reallocation by the disk controller, but doesn't that only happen if data can't be properly written in the first place anyways?
[1]: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897443.asp...
SSDs lie about this, and the only way to check is to go forensic on the raw flash.
Source: Wei et al, "Reliably Erasing Data From Flash-Based Solid State Drives", Usenix FAST'11, https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/fast11/tech/full_papers/...
yes, ata secure erase, which guarantees erasure of the entire drive (excluding vendor specific areas)
I think most controllers implement a secure erase feature that guarantees the data have been erased from NAND.
> the entire encrypted volume looks like it's in use to the SSD controller
I have always wondered how encrypted volume worked on an SSD. It seems this will lead to serious performance issues due to ineffective garbage collection.