Re:Provably Fair Shuffling Through Cryptography (2012)
by fryguy on Friday June 13, 2014 @01:57PM
(#7890064)
to go from deck_{a1,b1} to deck_{a2,b1} you need to remove the encryption. In order to remove E(k_{a1}, ?), you need to know which one was used, but can't, because it was shuffled. If you were able to know which one was used, you would know which card it was.
Encrypting multiple values with the same key and initialization vector (or the same key and no IV) is usually a bad idea no matter the scenario.
Assuming Alice has secret keys k_{a1}, k_{a2} and Bob has secrets keys k_{b1}, k_{b2}:
When cards are dealt and decrypted, nothing is leaked about the other cards. Again, you still need parties to commit to their keys when publishing the shuffled deck, but that is likely a requirement of other implementations too — the attack is simply more obvious when using a stream cipher due to the ease of malleability. Generating an authenticator the deck ciphertext at each step is probably also a reasonable idea, but I haven't given it much thought. This is supposed to be an illustrative example (e.g., random IVs would need to be much larger than 32 bits).