I'd say that's more than enough time for maintainers downstream to upgrade (and it's already longer than most software stays supported for - so if maintainers aren't pushing updates then there's going to be other layers of the stack that's unpatched and thus vulnerable).
10 years would seem to me to be above the minimum required though, you're right. I'm not sure how far under 10 years I'd be willing to say that for.
And no matter what is reasonable -- there WILL be software still running that's even older than 10 years, for which there's no longer any developers confident they can update to a new version of OpenSSL with potentially backwards-breaking changes. Reasonable or not.
And people make these evaluations by talking about them on the internet. That's how it works, that's what we're doing.
There are other considerations, like cost-of-switch and availability of suitable alternatives, sure.
But we talk about this all on the internet. Same as 'demanding' that someone fix heartbleed or other bugs in OpenSSL for us. Nobody has to do anything, but there is a point at which people will start looking for alternatives if things aren't done. And people talk about what that point is on the internet.
If the only way to get security fixes is to update to a new version that has other changes that may accidentally break things -- this is really bad for such a key piece of (security!) infrastructure.