You tell me where you think the line should be drawn:

(a) You agree not to leave Apple* for Google, for 3 years.

(b) You agree not work for Google, ever.

(c) You agree not to develop software for anyone besides Apple for 3 years.

(d) You agree not to develop software for anyone besides Apple, ever.

(e) You agree not to do any kind of work for anyone besides Apple for 3 years.

(f) You agree not to do any kind of work for anyone besides Apple, forever.

Personally, I don't think any of those contracts should be enforceable by law, regardless of what people foolishly choose to sign.

* (the choice of Apple being entirely arbitrary)

However I draw the line, it would not be grounded in appeal to the existence of a right to choice in labor, as you attempted to justify it.

There are good arguments for prohibiting certain arrangements; the one you gave wasn't one of them. That's all I was trying to say.

For philosophical reasons, I like using the idea of fundamental human rights to justify things more than simple pragmatism. It makes it easier to build a solid foundation of things that can be taken for granted in a human existence, making more cognitive effort available for other matters.

People also have a universal, fundamental right to some level of property ownership. But if you equate that with the obligation never to waive it in exchange for something else (e.g. sell or give their stuff), as the GGGP was doing, then "you're doing it wrong".

There are good reasons to oppose the specific exchange of rights involved in these non-compete agreements. Pointing out the existence of the rights is not one of them, because the entire dispute is about why it should not be waive-able.