OpenSSL Security Advisory

Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by Alupis on Thursday June 05, 2014 @10:46AM (#7852207)

If I'm understanding the CVE correctly, it has nothing to do with the browser. It's when it's on the Server, an attacker could just make OpenSSL think their "browser" doesn't support all of the good algo's and eventually cycle through it's available algo's until a relatively insecure one is decided upon (like the relatively weak CBC algo's).

So, it is a potential threat to servers since most web server are *nix based and most of those will have the default of OpenSSL installed.

However, I seem to recall this always being a possible attack vector, in any SSL/TLS library due to how browsers/servers have always negotiated which algo to use based on which are commonly supported and the strongest available... so ... nothing new?

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Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by jgrahamc on Thursday June 05, 2014 @11:33AM (#7852423)

Adam Langley at Google has a good technical description here: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/06/05/earlyccs.html

Specifically,

    With any OpenSSL client talking to an OpenSSL 1.0.1 
    server, an attacker can inject CCS messages to fixate the 
    bad keys at both ends but the Finished hashes will still 
    line up. So it's possible for the attacker to decrypt    
    and/or hijack the connection completely.

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