I'm not going to jump the gun just yet but after snowden it's not out of the question.
edit: Confirmed Microsoft stores your recovery key on their servers if you're not connected to a domain: http://windows.microsoft.com/en-AU/windows-8/bitlocker-recov...
Whether or not they superstitiously store it anyway is a different question.
I suppose they could be approached by someone to plant backdoor into the software, but I wonder if that can be done without someone noticing it...
EDIT: I normaly don't care. But this time I'd be glad if who downmoded this post explained why.
http://sourceforge.net/p/truecrypt/activity/?page=0&limit=10...
Besides the different file name, the contents of the files match: http://www.diffchecker.com/szpb500v
The only way to verify is if you have the previous key stored somewhere, or can find a trustpath to it.
E3BA73CAF0D6B1E0 C5F4 BAC4 A7B2 2DB8 B8F8 5538 E3BA 73CA F0D6 B1E0
Checks out.
pub 1024D/F0D6B1E0 2004-06-06
Key fingerprint = C5F4 BAC4 A7B2 2DB8 B8F8 5538 E3BA 73CA F0D6 B1E0
uid TrueCrypt Foundation <[email protected]>
sub 4077g/6B136ECF 2004-06-06
My version from September is identical to the pub key at http://sourceforge.net/projects/truecrypt/files/TrueCrypt/Ot... . tc/linux$ sha1sum *
c2a8c78a23f97ffb17bf47448c9f2daa3c8f80cd truecrypt-7.1a-linux-console-x64.tar.gz
078cdd4a58f0342cb872d7456c0ba49e310fcad9 truecrypt-7.1a-linux-console-x64.tar.gz.sig
a53a7a609a25d9a1e33f720ce5c0265ddd4e8b25 truecrypt-7.1a-linux-console-x86.tar.gz
66060f9444d5df70b4fcdeb655dc60131fce5ad1 truecrypt-7.1a-linux-console-x86.tar.gz.sig
086cf24fad36c2c99a6ac32774833c74091acc4d truecrypt-7.1a-linux-x64.tar.gz
45f65bf755d9481d8afa0d17de6a034062b7a7bd truecrypt-7.1a-linux-x64.tar.gz.sig
0e77b220dbbc6f14101f3f913966f2c818b0f588 truecrypt-7.1a-linux-x86.tar.gz
9efcd79e963126d6d8ef242857b4fafb06eb8ff0 truecrypt-7.1a-linux-x86.tar.gz.sig
d43e0dbe05c04e316447d87413c4f74c68f5de24 TrueCrypt 7.1a Source.tar.gz
caeb2bb1d5605d1fc960e936a06e52611033788c TrueCrypt 7.1a Source.tar.gz.sig
c871f833d6c115f4b4861eed859ff512e994b9fc TrueCrypt-Foundation-Public-Key.asc
tc/windows$ sha1sum *
06961d83e39c7248df09c132cb6e9b9f528ce69a Configuration.xml
88b323b416290924621901a10da3f4f7482e3f77 License.txt
4c4891f5eafcf9b96be01e31031992d9e98d39c3 TrueCrypt.exe
34442e400e6cb2534f33a0b1599defe36eefef2a TrueCrypt Format.exe
7689d038c76bd1df695d295c026961e50e4a62ea TrueCrypt Setup 7.1a.exe
e1e3efaeac2fbcdbff0c2c62ac33233bd356edfa TrueCrypt Setup 7.1a.exe.sig
62fc4f76540740e63c7f0a33e3a1b66411f0a303 truecrypt.sys
17249d979b3bc52d0a33821cc7f810337ddea2b6 TrueCrypt User Guide.pdf
17c46ebc6f4977afbcf4aa11eccee524fd95b1c8 truecrypt-x64.sys gpg --import TrueCrypt-Foundation-Public-Key.asc
gpg --fingerprint F0D6B1E0
gpg --verify truecrypt-7.1a-linux-x64.tar.gz.sig
You should see: gpg: Signature made Tue 07 Feb 2012 12:45:26 PM PST using DSA key ID F0D6B1E0
gpg: Good signature from "TrueCrypt Foundation <[email protected]>"
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Primary key fingerprint: C5F4 BAC4 A7B2 2DB8 B8F8 5538 E3BA 73CA F0D6 B1E0Even if it's a legit announcement, I wouldn't run that 7.2 binary. Anyone running truecrypt already has truecrypt, right? I don't know why they'd release a new version at the same time as such a dire and panic-inducing announcement.
[1] http://sourceforge.net/blog/sourceforge-net-global-password-...
I frequently reformat my boot volumes—but I've had a .tc file laying around on an external HD since forever, with my websites' X.509 private keys and such inside.
I'm probably going to do exactly as this announcement says: download the export-only binary, create a loop-mounted LUKS volume, and migrate everything over.
Just quickly scroll through the diff (better version here: https://gist.github.com/anonymous/e5791d5703325b9cf6d1) and you will immediately see that all that was done is disable/remove a majority of the functionality.
AbortProcess ("INSECURE_APP");
Print ("WARNING: Using TrueCrypt is not secure");
They added exceptions/rose errors/printed warnings everywhere where you could possibly encrypt and all of it reflects their intent at the Sourceforge page.Anyway, it was a joke.
edit: But I'm not touching that binary with a 10 foot pole, thank you. There isn't even any guarantee yet that that source compiles into the given binary.
https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/47175105467398963...
Is this real? Is there a known vulnerability that catalyzed this? Money from Microsoft? Threats?
I'm not buying into conspiracy theories, but it does seem pretty out of place.