News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Many sites reusing Heartbleed-compromised private keys by abritishguy on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @08:43AM (#7743376)
You should not be responsible for website security if you don't understand the absolute basics of SSL certificates.

It would be helpful if the CA (or reseller) confirmed (dispay a warning) that you really want to reissue with the same private key and explain the implications of doing so.

When reissuing a certificate the default behaviour should be to revoke the old one after some specified time has elapsed - that is what reissuing is for and what distinguishes it from simply buying a new certificate.

Re:Many sites reusing Heartbleed-compromised private keys by mobiplayer on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @07:44AM (#7743170)
This.

The problem is that many people in the industry doesn't really understand the basics. How come is there a leak of your certificate, if that's the public key you're showing to every single client that connects to your SSL enabled site?

I've even seen sysads advising on forums about reissuing certs after Heartbleed, but no word about the keys.

Re:Many sites reusing Heartbleed-compromised private keys by mikeash on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @12:25PM (#7744561)
I think that "no word about the keys" is simply due to a huge gulf in understanding. To the people giving out the advice, it's obvious that "reissue your certificates" implies "with a new private key", so obvious that they can't even imagine someone doing otherwise. It's easy to skip out on the basics that you're sure "everyone knows".
Re:Many sites reusing Heartbleed-compromised private keys by higherpurpose on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @08:36AM (#7743347)
Maybe they should just be advised to use PFS/ECDHE instead (which should be done anyway), and it would solve this problem by itself.
Re:Many sites reusing Heartbleed-compromised private keys by sdevlin on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @08:41AM (#7743372)
That would not solve the problem of active man-in-the-middle attacks.
Re:Many sites reusing Heartbleed-compromised private keys by mobiplayer on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @08:58AM (#7743437)
Yes, even renewing your keys and certs doesn't mean any previous communication is not compromised :)
Re:Many sites reusing Heartbleed-compromised private keys by pronoiac on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @08:45AM (#7743385)
Ugh. I think it would be better if revocation covered the public key instead of the serial number. (I'll ignore CRL bandwidth costs and the questionable usefulness of revocations.)
Re:Many sites reusing Heartbleed-compromised private keys by aastaneh on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @08:14PM (#7747314)
YUP! I covered that exact subject (http://aminastaneh.net/2014-04-23/misconceptions-about-mitig...), but it didn't catch on in HN.
Re:Many sites reusing Heartbleed-compromised private keys by nodata on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @07:52AM (#7743200)
i.e. they re-used the same CSR without realising that the CSR references the old compromised key.
Re:Many sites reusing Heartbleed-compromised private keys by unreal37 on Wednesday May 14, 2014 @10:36AM (#7743983)
The odds of this being a real issue that will affect anyone are in the tiny fractions of a percent range.