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Re:Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack by tptacek on Tuesday May 13, 2014 @04:52PM (#7740627)
The IETF considered replacing Igoe. No consensus was reached. People with lots of IETF institutional credibility (ie: that had been instrumental in previous standardization efforts, ones in which no tampering concerns were entertained by anyone) strongly disagreed with his ouster.

Also, from a political perspective, the effort to replace Igoe was hamstrung by the lack of anyone in the universe raising their hand and saying "I'm a respected cryptographer AND I want to punch myself in the face continuously for several years by chairing CFRG".

The less reverence the Internet has for the cryptographic wisdom of the IETF, the better off I think we all are.

Re:Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack by jchrisa on Tuesday May 13, 2014 @07:41PM (#7741299)
What do you think about IETF-JOSE? I've been using it as sort of a cookbook for signing and encryption. They even have a cookbook: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-cookbook/
Re:Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack by tptacek on Tuesday May 13, 2014 @08:14PM (#7741426)
JOSE includes JSON canonicalization, which scares the crap out of me. If I had the choice, I'd treat JSON as binary --- a whitespace change would, for a signed file, break the signature.

JOSE also includes RSA PKCS1v1.5 signatures, which are deprecated (you should use RSA-PSS, which JOSE also documents).

It includes naive nondeterministic DSA, which should be deprecated in favor of deterministic DSA or something like Ed25519.

It doesn't include details you actually want about curve selection. (Also, P-521?!)

It includes encryption under RSA PKCS1v1.5 (encryption with v1.5 is even worse than signing under it) and AES-CBC, which is disfavored by cryptographers.

(My understanding of JOSE is cursory, at best, so I wouldn't be surprised to be corrected on any of these).