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Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by mikeash on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @12:51PM (#7711237)
The Space Shuttle was a political football whose design was dictated by the whims of Congress and the meddling of the military first, and by engineering second.

The Shuttle was required to be reusable as a political goal. However, it was not given the funding it needed to actually accomplish it in any reasonable fashion.

The Air Force put some tough requirements on it, such as the requirement for enough cross-range capability when landing to be able to launch into a polar orbit from Vandenberg, deploy a satellite, and land back one orbit later. This is purely a wartime requirement. No peacetime mission needs this. This required much bigger wings (and thus much more weight), even though the Shuttle never once launched out of Vandenberg, let alone on one of these crazy single-orbit missions.

Politics screwed up other stuff too. The solid rocket boosters, for example, were manufactured on the other side of the country, largely because of Congressional pork. The long and difficult transport process required the boosters to be built segmented, and that design directly lead to the loss oF Challenger.

Similarly, budget constraints dictated the cheaper SRB-plus-external-tank design rather than a more sophisticated and more reusable (and more expensive) reusable booster. This design directly lead to the loss of Columbia.

The net result was that the Shuttle had a very narrow engineering margin. The SSMEs are engineering marvels in terms of how light they are and how much power they put out. But putting out a lot of power for little weight is a really bad plan for something you want to reuse. Reusability means robustness, and robustness means extra weight and less power.

The Shuttle is what you get when you say, "How much will it cost for a reusable launch system? $10 billion? Too much, we'll give you $5 billion." (Numbers in the ballpark but mostly made up for illustration.)

On the other hand, the Falcon 9R is what you get when a for-profit space launch company wants to make more money. It's not a prestige project, it's not a political project, it's not a military project dictated by thoughts of all-out war with the USSR, it's not subject to Presidential grandstanding or Congressional pork. It's just a bunch of smart people thinking of ways to save their customers money and turn a better profit while doing it.

The Shuttle was an extremely ambitious design that did everything differently. Ultimately, everything was too ambitious to be reusable.

Falcon 9R, on the other hand, is deeply unambitious. The rocket is a pretty standard design. They don't even try to use liquid hydrogen for any stage, even though it's theoretically more efficient, instead favoring easier-to-handle kerosene. Their rocket engines are high performance but not on the bleeding edge. And when they decided to go for reusability, instead of building a whole new system with wings and ceramic tiles and all sorts of other extreme innovations, they just said, let's slap some legs on the first stage and give it some extra fuel. It's a completely different approach that pretty much only shares the word "reusable".

I don't think the Shuttle really has many lessons to offer when evaluating the potential of Falcon 9R.

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by VLM on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @01:13PM (#7711404)
"Their rocket engines are high performance"

No all contemporary Russian engines have a much higher Isp. Usually because they use high chamber pressures in the 3000+ psi range. The merlin series runs a mere 1000 psi.

It does win one performance metric of thrust to weight. Little surprise because they might give up 10% of thrust (err, whatever) by running at a lower pressure but obviously running a third of the chamber pressure the engine walls are going to be about a third the thickness and a third the mass, so its a huge win for thrust to weight, knock down the nominator by 10% and the denominator by a factor of 3 and you win. So they do hold a record in this category.

Also lower pressures imply lower temps imply lower thermal load, lower heat shock, lower thermal distortion and thermal related stress on startup/shutdown. It inherently should always outperform a Russian engine WRT restart / reusability unless something has gone very wrong.

Two things make engines un-reusable. One is simple runtime. It seems intuitively obvious that a 1000 psi turbopump is cheaper and more reliable than a 3000 psi turbopump, all things being equal. The other thing that kills reusability is thermal shock effects where need something to be "X" thick to handle the forces and pressures, but the exterior or one side heats up much faster than the inside creating enormous stresses. So low pressure means low temps

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by hga on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @01:06PM (#7711355)
"and the meddling of the military"

"The Air Force put some tough requirements on it, such as the requirement for enough cross-range capability when landing to be able to launch into a polar orbit from Vandenberg, deploy a satellite, and land back one orbit later."

That's not what I remember at the time this was happening, nor was it e.g. the story in a good study published in Science. Sure, the DoD/intelligence community wouldn't have minded such a capability, but NASA insisted on it to make the shuttle more attractive to them and to help justify the monopoly NASA obtained on these sorts of launches.

Something the DoD didn't like at all, and was partly freed from after the Challenger disaster. Which also prompted a closer look at the safety of Vandenberg launches and the canceling of them.

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by mikeash on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @01:16PM (#7711421)
Here's a source for you:

http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4221/ch5.htm

Quote: "However, it meant that if a shuttle was to execute a one-orbit mission from Vandenberg, it would return to the latitude of that base after 90 minutes in space only to find that, due to the earth's rotation, this base had moved to the east by 1100 nautical miles. Air Force officials indeed expected to launch the Shuttle from Vandenberg, and they insisted that the Shuttle had to have enough crossrange to cover that distance and return successfully."

It goes into quite a bit of detail on the Air Force's involvement and reasoning.

I'd be interested to see them if you had sources that say otherwise.

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by hga on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @01:37PM (#7711564)
You don't suppose the official, house NASA history of the Shuttle might be a bit unreliable on these issues???

My sources are what I contemporaneously learned and remembered in the '70s, and that paper in Science (the world's #2 science journal after Nature, not that it wasn't back then very political, just that this claim cuts against their politics). It would have been published in the '80s, very possibly after the Challenger disaster prompted a lot of second looks, but I can't be more specific.

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by mikeash on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @02:15PM (#7711814)
Yes, an official NASA history is certainly going to be biased.

On the other hand, you've given me no reason whatsoever to believe you over them. Your ??? is completely out of line. I merely gave a source for what I said and asked if you had one. I understand if you don't, but don't be surprised if I then don't necessarily believe your claim.

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by hga on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @02:26PM (#7711859)
But I do have a source; it would be behind a paywall if I could find it/went to the trouble of trying to find it (the search would probably cost money to make sure I found the right article). At best I hoped to plant a seed of doubt about yet another archetypal bashing of the military; clearly I've failed.

My "???" indicates I think it's quite possible the author's sources lied to him. You're welcome to believe that NASA people, when talking about their greatest and most expensive in every way failure---these decisions killed two complete crews of 7 each---are more honest than I am, but I'm not entirely sure how much company you'll have, the world has seen rather a lot of post-Apollo NASA by now....

(This alone should give one serious pause: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers_Commission_Report#Role_...).

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by mikeash on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @02:41PM (#7711940)
It's not "bashing of the military". The Air Force didn't want the Shuttle, but once they were forced into it, they wanted to make it useful to them. The fault lies with the people who forced two organizations with widely different goals to come up with a single vehicle that worked for both of them.

I don't understand your incredulity at my reaction. What exactly did you think was going to happen when you showed up making an effectively anonymous comment saying, "no, that's wrong, believe my 30-year-old memories over the official history"?

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by hga on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @05:17PM (#7712711)
You're contradicting yourself: first you said:

"The Space Shuttle was a political football whose design was dictated by the whims of Congress and the meddling of the military first...."

Then you note the military didn't want it, but wanted it to be useful if forced. I would add the Science article specifically addressed the single orbit polar mission, saying the Air Force didn't see a great need for that and would have been happy with gentler flight profiles. It explicitly said NASA insisted on it, and that's consistent with their post-Apollo institutional biases, much the same produced the hot-rod SSMEs.

"Meddling", when it wasn't, qualifies as bashing in my book, especially in the full context of your sentence.

As for my incredulity, maybe start here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historiography

I was a History minor in college....

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by mikeash on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @10:18PM (#7713639)
I don't see the contradiction. They were forced into the project and then they screwed with it.

However, if you insist on taking offense at my comment, I'm not going to fight it that hard. I'm not really interested in what offends you.

What I am interested in is some sort of external source for the stuff you're saying. Pseudonymous internet comments from "hga" and vague references to "the Science article" don't count.

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by InclinedPlane on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @01:13PM (#7711396)
> The Space Shuttle was a political football whose design was dictated by the whims of Congress and the meddling of the military first, and by engineering second.

Partly true, but keep in mind that was a problem NASA brought on themselves. They chose an overly ambitious design which congress, rightfully in my opinion, balked at. They tried to skip technological generations, which is a nono in R&D and always a very expensive and risky prospect. Instead of coming up with a new idea they doubled down on their fantasy, turning the Shuttle idea into a political juggernaut. And they got their way, they got massive buy in into the Shuttle, by selling it to everyone as the be-all-end-all of everyone's space dreams. It would be all things to all customers: NASA manned spaceflight, NASA space science, commercial satellite companies, even the military. But part of the cost of that political juggernaut was imposition of additional design elements, which brought more compromises. But on the other hand with so many people on board the program had political inevitability and was almost impossible to shut down. The Shuttle would already have been a bit of a turkey relative to its promises but those additional compromises made it one of the most expensive and troublesome launchers in history. But those compromises came about because of the unwillingness of the Shuttle's original backers to consider other options, they made those deals and those compromises and they were forced to live with the consequences.

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by BrandonMarc on Friday May 09, 2014 @12:51AM (#7719433)
The Air Force ... [required] ... enough cross-range capability when landing to be able to launch into a polar orbit from Vandenberg, deploy a satellite, and land back one orbit later. This is purely a wartime requirement. No peacetime mission needs this. This required much bigger wings (and thus much more weight), even though the Shuttle never once launched out of Vandenberg, let alone on one of these crazy single-orbit missions.

THANK YOU! 16 years ago I visited Vandenberg and saw SLC-6, and it has always confused me why they spent so much money building a shuttle launch complex they never used. The argument I always heard was, "well a polar orbit wouldn't make sense for the shuttle" ... but as a wartime option as you describe, now I can see why they did it.

I'm not saying I agree with them, but finally it makes sense why they built and maintained the place, without ever using it.

Re:NASA, CNES Warn SpaceX of Challenges in Flying Reusable F... by hga on Friday May 09, 2014 @07:32AM (#7720269)
Errr, not exactly.

Without wandering into the weeds of the other subthread, NASA managed to get a mandate that the shuttle would be the sole method of putting US satellites into orbit. Forget about the wartime requirements or desires, this meant that anything the military wanted to put into a polar orbit would have to be done by the shuttle, naturally launching from Vandenberg.

Going from memory of what I've read in the last few days, and of what went into the decision, one factor was the shuttle ended up 20% overweight, and the higher energy requirements for polar orbit launches resulted in a plan for lighter filament-wound instead of steel SRBs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Solid_Rocket_Boo... and of course the Challenger disaster helped people to realize just how dangerous the SRB concept was to begin with.

Post Challenger, during the Shuttle fleet's 3 year grounding, a hard look was taken at what was needed to bring SLC-6 up to spec (see end of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SLC-6#Space_Shuttle), and NASA was no longer in a position to force the Air Force to use the shuttle. Which the latter had always thought unwise and the disaster proved to all who could see.