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A comment on Why I won’t work for Google. Parent comment

Re:Why I won’t work for Google by harshreality on Saturday May 03, 2014 @03:39AM (#7689989)
Agreed. The response seems to conflate a bunch of different things and pretend it's all Google's fault. Snowden didn't blow the whistle on Google. Google can't control what the NSA is tapping or what court orders it gets. Maybe some people inside Google knew about inter-datacenter taps and didn't do anything about it, but once all of Google became aware, they started encrypting those links. Automatic indexing of email contents leaves Google open to subpoenas for information about that indexed content, but the emails would be there to subpoena either way. I don't understand the problem.

What has Google ever done to help TLAs wiretap anyone?

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Re:Why I won’t work for Google by politician on Saturday May 03, 2014 @05:51AM (#7690198)
Occasionally, I wonder if HN sells data on which way we vote for articles and comments. I guess we'll never know since they could be under an NSL.
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Re:Why I won’t work for Google by Apachez on Saturday May 03, 2014 @04:00AM (#7690023)
Encryption is worthless if you have handed over the cipherkeys... but I guess this might fool some of the public at least.
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Re:Why I won’t work for Google by prolde on Saturday May 03, 2014 @06:56AM (#7690302)
Encryption can be done in a matter where the private keys are stored in the user's end, making it far harder for the likes of the NSA to break the encryption.

One example of this is Jitsi's implementation of Off The Recording chatting. When using an XMPP server through Jitsi, the NSA may be able to read the cipher text sent but not the plaintext because the keys are stored on the chat participants computers. Not even the chat server owners know the chat plaintext.

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Re:Why I won’t work for Google by thefreeman on Saturday May 03, 2014 @09:45AM (#7690712)
Doesn't Perfect Forward Secrecy protect against that? I am not sure if Google have implemented it but according to the Wikipedia entry:

This means that the compromise of one message cannot lead to the compromise of others, and also that there is not a single secret value which can lead to the compromise of multiple messages.

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