That's the thing I don't understand about this whole discussion: The SafeBrowsing blacklist bloom filter that Google itself made and uses is significantly smaller, is updated in real time, and doesn't have a big runtime overhead. Why not just have a bloom filter for revocations, with a Google server doing the false-positive elimination?
(Yes, there is a little bit of a chicken-and-egg problem when it comes to the Google server, but that's a much smaller problem than being unable to check if most certificates in the world are revoked or not.)
Edit: Looks like Adam (of course) already considered this: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/04/29/filters.html
Why shouldn't someone who cares very much about security be able to tell their browser to get the full 30MB it would require today, or the 300MB Langley projects it will take in 5 years? That's not that much data!
(Google's hand-curated tiny CRLSet lifeboat is currently only ~308KB of blacklisted certificate data.)
Why can't the organizations with multi-hundred-million-dollar budgets for web projects design the privacy-preserving/space-saving/probabilistic systems that would make this work with much smaller overhead?
Once the original site, the CA, and a major browser vendor all know, via public info, that a certificate is compromised, why should any browser user have to wait days/weeks/months/indefinitely, while showing the false "lock icon", before warning users?