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Re:Tails 1.0 is out by GimbalLock on Tuesday April 29, 2014 @05:14PM (#7669990)
Could you expound on why?
Re:Tails 1.0 is out by garrettgrimsley on Tuesday April 29, 2014 @05:23PM (#7670039)
An adversary could modify your image. It's possible that they could have your copy phone home through a non-anonymized route, revealing information about your identity.

They could also make it so that your route all information through their nodes, or eavesdrop through a built-in microphone or camera.

All sorts of nasty things, all with persistence between boots.

Re:Tails 1.0 is out by GimbalLock on Tuesday April 29, 2014 @05:25PM (#7670049)
Interesting. Do you mean by physically accessing the USB drive and changing it, or software that waits to modify the USB drive once connected? Thank you!
Re:Tails 1.0 is out by garrettgrimsley on Tuesday April 29, 2014 @05:49PM (#7670149)
I'm not sure what you are asking exactly.

I was talking about using a USB drive as the medium for your Tails Live"CD."

The point of Tails is that unless you explicitly take action to make changes or save files, nothing that you do will be persistent across restarts. The memory of the PC you were using is wiped, and the medium on which you store the Tails OS has not been modified. The next time you start Tails you will have a fresh copy. No personal information, no settings that could distinguish you from any other vanilla Tails user. You'll be presented with the same toolkit tailored to privacy and security every time.

If an attacker is able to compromise one session it is a problem, but maybe they didn't gather the intelligence they needed to de-anonymize you. Now, if they can make it so that your copy of Tails boots with their exploits already loaded, then there's a major problem.

Re:Tails 1.0 is out by GimbalLock on Tuesday April 29, 2014 @07:35PM (#7670633)
Okay. I got you now. Thanks. I just didn't know how exactly the USB drive was going to get modified by an attacker.