What I took away is: if you think parapsychology is wrong, then you should be really worried about the rest of science because their studies are not better designed. It's most clearly expressed in this paragraph:
> This is not a criticism of Bem or a criticism of parapsychology. Itβs something that is inherent to the practice of meta-analysis, and even more, inherent to the practice of science. Other than a few very exceptional large medical trials, there is not a study in the world that would survive the level of criticism I am throwing at Bem right now.
If psi does not exist, let science discover that, not preclude it.
I just don't see how it's meant to work here. If you think that something's part of reality, what's the problem with a stricter standard of proof? If someone screws it up, then it'll be obvious: loads of stuff will become untestable - (worse than just being impractically pricey to test, it will become in principle untestable) - at the same time.
Do you have any substantive objections to making the standard of proof stricter, other than that it would preclude psi?
If you think that a stricter standard of proof would preclude psi but not other things, why do you think psi is an accurate description?
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Maybe what I'm saying is unscientific. :/
So be it, I guess. There's nothing innately great about science - it's just a tool; a method, to get to the truth. The truth itself is only really of value for its instrumental power, as far as I'm concerned - if you didn't require truth to actually do something, then you could make up any method and believe that its results were true.
Say it was 1600 A.D. and we would like to improve the standards of science. Everybody knows the cart stops when the ox stops pulling, so why not use this reasonable observation as a litmus test for all future scientific endeavor? Bye, Newton.
The whole article is just a particular set of beliefs trying to institutionalize itself, the very thing science is supposed to put an end to.