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Re:LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back by tptacek on Wednesday April 23, 2014 @01:12PM (#7635370)
FIPS compliance includes support for dubious cryptography and protocol standards. While it doesn't necessitate things like Dual_EC and extended_random, it does create a hospitable environment for their inclusion.

"FIPS support" also demands configurations that rule out some cryptography, some of it bad, some of it reasonable. FIPS support doesn't require OpenSSL not to implement those algorithms, but it does require a mode of operation that does.

Against that complexity, the only win is the ability to deploy the FIPS-compliant code in FedGov settings, which is something that an OpenBSD fork of OpenSSL doesn't need to do to be successful.

Re:LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back by ef47d35620c1 on Wednesday April 23, 2014 @01:34PM (#7635509)
Also, I believe that only binaries can be FIPS certified, not source code, so there are times when one has to use an old, out-dated openssl binary in order to be compliant.
Re:LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back by sanxiyn on Wednesday April 23, 2014 @01:52PM (#7635638)
OpenSSL FIPS certification (#1747) is for source code, not for binary. This is highly unusual indeed, but it is not the case that only binaries can be FIPS certified.

On the other hand, you can't change the source without losing the certification, so it doesn't actually matter.

Re:LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back by pgeorgi on Wednesday April 23, 2014 @03:52PM (#7636485)
So any change to openssl fips has to happen as compiler patches?
Re:LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back by danudey on Wednesday April 23, 2014 @04:46PM (#7636774)
No, changing the source means you're not using FIPS-compliant source so you're breaking your terms.

This is why you might have to use old versions of OpenSSL for FIPS compliance - not all versions might be certified.

Re:LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back by eslaught on Wednesday April 23, 2014 @11:28PM (#7638347)
I think the GP is talking about a trusting trust attack on OpenSSL: Change the compiler to compile OpenSSL differently, rather than change the source itself.
Re:LibreSSL: FIPS mode is not coming back by ballard on Wednesday April 23, 2014 @08:27PM (#7637849)
I guess it begs the question (FIPS mode seems to fail the "talk to a cryptographer rule"): why don't/aren't sec folks more involved to assure standards are meaningful? Was this a NIST-driven process or was it open to public comments?