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Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation by ecma on Thursday April 17, 2014 @07:57PM (#7607270)
Interesting that this comes up again with Ubuntu Trusty continuing to retain Xorg. Is anyone familiar enough with Mir and Wayland to comment on how those packages approach this kind of thing?
Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation by htns on Thursday April 17, 2014 @08:24PM (#7607338)
Both fix it by making snooping and spoofing unavailable by default. An application only has access to its own windows, inasmuch processes are properly isolated in other aspects as well. Typically they aren't, e.g. very few distros have any "single user level" safeguards for ~/.bashrc. Qubes solves that problem as well.
Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation by flogic on Thursday April 17, 2014 @09:15PM (#7607492)
Does it actually matter? For the average desktop, everything of monetary value will be under the main user account. Which is generally also the account used to touch the internet.
Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation by ecma on Thursday April 17, 2014 @11:43PM (#7607854)
I think it does matter. Defence is relevant at almost every level of software. If a window manager can make smart design choices to make it non-trivial to implement bad software for the interfaces it serves, it's an obvious choice IMO.
Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation by XorNot on Friday April 18, 2014 @01:51AM (#7608097)
This is a problem which needs to be fixed, as cryptolocker demonstrates.

We really need some hard boundaries set between non-interactive and interactive requests to open files.

Sensible ones too - not "ask about every file", but maybe "grant process access to this folder in my documents folder, without recursive access".

Even better would be "fire this backup utility first, then grant access".

Re:The Linux Security Circus: On GUI isolation by antocv on Friday April 18, 2014 @05:45AM (#7608586)
This could be implemented for ~ using a fuse.