If a system is on the internet, securing it is a cost that has to be born by the retailer.
- stolen goods are hard to sell, and like others have mentioned credit cards are re-sold to others who make most of the profit
- even if there is a suspicion that a card has been stolen, it is often re-issued, causing a lot of operational cost even if it was not actually among those stolen
A lot of other options too like others have mentioned.
To me this is the most interesting part of the whole "hacking chain" and almost nobody can/wants to explain it... And it's also obvious that if law enforcement would concentrate on making this harder to do, the value of stolen cc numbers would very fast o low enough to make the hacker loose any incentive for doing this kind of thing.
It's high risk process involving going to the store so most of the profits go to the mules. Credit card numbers are cheap - just a few dollars per card. There is black market for that stuff - you can google and find a bunch of articles about it.
The article doesn't explain the discrepancy between the tiny earnings of the hackers and the enormous loss of the banks. Which one of these is it?:
1) The hackers lied and have millions stashed away some place?
2) The middlemen who buy the card data from the hackers and get mules to make fraudulent charges and withdrawals are the ones raking it in?
3) The banks are puffing up their losses in order to get tax deductions or make insurance claims, or maybe just to get the Secret Service interested enough in the case to do an investigation?
The banks can exaggerate their loss in all kinds of ways: including in the loss payments that they were able to later reverse, or including losses that were eaten by the merchants and not the bank, or including the salary of every member of their security and fraud department, etc.