I was under the impression that stuff gets encrypted with the public key, and can only be decrypted with the private key. Doesn't owning the private key let you snoop on all traffic, all of the time, forever until they change the keys?
On the other hand, as the above comment says, you can use heartbleed in other ways, such as catching people's cookies from memory, then insert those cookies into your own browser and hijack their connection.
Among the things I'm famous for is having written a proxy server you can aim your browser through in order to do cookie hijacking: https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/hamster/
This might be useful here: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/why-web-needs-perfect-...
If really interested in the topic, Google the acronyms on this page: http://www.certificate-transparency.org/comparison
I don't understand this comment. If they steal your private key, they can impersonate the client and do everything the client can do. I don't understand the "impersonate the SSL server".
If they steal the public key, then they can impersonate the server.
If someone can steal your private key, yes, they can now impersonate your SSL server. For HTTPS, they'll need to actually perform a DNS spoof or similar to truly exploit that change, though. I guess there might be more of a concern about things like DKIM keys being stolen. We have to be a little less trusting of SSL certs to verify identity.
But in all this fuss about the keys, we seem to be forgetting that the heartbleed vulnerability allowed attackers to sniff random cleartext as it passed through OpenSSL. Session identities, usernames, passwords, sure - but again, the security industry focuses on credentials being stolen as the worst case scenario. But what about all the other private data going across the SSL connection?
This reminds me a little of the focus on operating system security preventing privilege escalation, while ignoring the risk of malware trashing all of a user's own data - you might lose all your photographs, but at least the device drivers will be safe.
When it comes to heartbleed, users might legitimately fear that data they sent over SSL could have been eavesdropped by anybody; but the security industry doesn't seem to care about that as much as it does about whether the private key could have been compromised.