Re:Heartbleed disclosure timeline: who knew what and when
by furyofantares on Tuesday April 15, 2014 @12:00PM
(#7592535)
> It was out for years, but discovered independently within days of each other.
Well, two years, the minimum number of years for which you can claim it was out for years. In order to avoid tricking yourself and your audience I'd stick to "a little over two years" rather than "years".
There were 749 days between a bugged version of OpenSSL being released and the flaw being discovered. There were 13 days between the independent discovery. That is still a small window compared to 749 days but not that small, and during that 749 days more and more people put bugged versions of OpenSSL into their infrastructure, which, I would assume, increases the chances that somebody discovers this flaw.
I would agree with you that it's not totally random -- of course it isn't, it's probably related to the state of the world changing over time. People adopting bugged versions is one factor, progress on security tools may be another, other publicized TLS bugs causing people to look harder at this area may be other, etc
Well, two years, the minimum number of years for which you can claim it was out for years. In order to avoid tricking yourself and your audience I'd stick to "a little over two years" rather than "years".
There were 749 days between a bugged version of OpenSSL being released and the flaw being discovered. There were 13 days between the independent discovery. That is still a small window compared to 749 days but not that small, and during that 749 days more and more people put bugged versions of OpenSSL into their infrastructure, which, I would assume, increases the chances that somebody discovers this flaw.
I would agree with you that it's not totally random -- of course it isn't, it's probably related to the state of the world changing over time. People adopting bugged versions is one factor, progress on security tools may be another, other publicized TLS bugs causing people to look harder at this area may be other, etc